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This study examines the link between leadership behaviors and employee
commitment, satisfaction and strength of culture in hospitals. The subjects were
five executives in not-for-profit hospitals that had measured the culture of their
hospitals with the same instrument twice over a longitudinal period of time.
During the intervening period the leadership of the hospital had undertaken
particular interventions in an effort to improve employee commitment,
satisfaction, and strength of the culture.
The assessment scores were collected for each of the hospitals, and the
leaders were then interviewed using a semi-structured interviewing technique
with an interview guideline to determine exactly what behaviors or actions had
been implemented. The degree to which the scores changed was then
compared and contrasted to the leadership behaviors implemented by the
executives.
The data suggest that some leadership behaviors positively influence
organizational culture more than others over time. Specific leadership
interventions can be identified as being predictors of stronger culture hospitals.
f
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Although some believe that the concept of a "corporate culture" is ill
defined or unimportant in the daily operations of a hospital or health system,
others define the culture of a company as the essential aspect of how that
organization conducts business and a determinant of the long term success of
that organization. Generally accepted definitions of "corporate culture" include
the concept of culture as a series of deeply embraced beliefs that play
themselves out in organizational formats such as customer focus, attention to the
needs of the customer, the capacity to proactively change in order to meet
customer or market demands, employee satts'faction, and the ability to accept,
adapt and plan change while .maintaining high employee morale, esprit de corps,
and low staff turnover.
Although the literature review will reveal some differences of opinion as to
an exact definition of culture and how it should be measured, there appears to
be a general consensus among researchers in the field that leadership has a
direct impact upon organizational culture. Further, some of the leadership
interventions that affect culture are purposeful and designed to do just that, while
other leader behaviors impact culture in an accidental but no less significant and
important way. Considerable attention is given in the literature toward use of
corporate culture as a powerful competitive tool. Researchers argue that a
strong corporate culture can be a powerful influence on the long-term business
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success of an organization, so long as that culture is not easily duplicated by
competitors. Changes in health care ... interpreted by many both within and
outside of the field as catastrophic ... have prompted increased attention to
culture by health care leaders who are eager to yoke whatever competitive
benefits may be had from the leader/culture relationship.
This study is designed to examine the relationship between leadership
and culture. For this study, culture is defined as the set of shared values,
beliefs, meaning, understanding and shared sense making that constitute a
process of reality construction allowing people to see and understand particular
events, actions, objects, utterances, or situations in distinctive ways (Morgan,
1997). These patterns of understanding help people cope with the situation
being encountered and also provide a bases for making one's own behavior
sensible and meaningful within the context of the organization. Culture will be
assessed utilizing a survey that measures culture as three components: (a)
employee commitment, (b) employee satisfaction, and (c) strength of culture.
Somewhat akin to the discussion of the various definitions of culture, the
literature also offers various definitions of what constitutes "leadership," but these
also have common threads (Rakich, Longest, & Darr, 1977). Leadership is
defined as that force which leads those in the organization who are subordinates
and have a reporting relationship to the leader, but in some instances those who
do not have a reporting relationship. The leader influences, instructs, and
commands work effort of others so as to accomplish a purpose such as attaining
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certain objectives that, as a rule, have been translated into work activities. For
the purposes of this study the leader is that individual who determines what
should be accomplished, influences others to that end, and directs their efforts
toward that purpose. Further, those being led ... the "followers" ... accept the
leader's role and influence over them (Rakish, Longest, & Darr, 1977).
The last several years have seen health care undergo tremendous
pressure to change. Many small hospitals have closed, been purchased by large
systems, or merged with other larger institutions or systems. Large systems and
big university teaching hospitals have contemplated mergers, joint ventures, and
business arrangements that only a few short years ago would have been
incomprehensible. Stilrother high profile me'rgers have already unraveled, as
though wormed apart from within by various political pressures, operational
failures, and abysmal financial performance. The future existence of the hospital
itself as a viable provider of healthcare services in any traditional sense that
could be readily recognized has even come into question.
These have been tough times for physicians. They have seen their
incomes flatten, and in many cases significantly decrease. For the first time in
several decades there have even been documented cases where physicians
have been "let go" due to lack of need, especially in some specialty and subspecialty areas. Clinical pathways and evidence based outcomes studies ... once
eschewed by physicians as "cookbook" medicine ... are now the standard of care,
and health systems are applying statistical process control methodologies to
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disease management. Patients find a pat on the head by the "doctor who
knows best" no longer acceptable. The physician has to call a utilization review
nurse to get permission to admit a patient to the hospital or he does not get paid
y

for professional services nor does the hospital receive payment for the
admission. Twenty years ago the idea of a physician having to get permission
from a nurse to admit a patient would have been considered heresy.
The passing of the Balanced Budget Amendment (BSA) has many
hospitals operating without margins great enough to satisfy lenders, and
heretofore relatively wealthy hospitals· credit ratings have been

downgraded~

Laws and regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) and the Emergency Medicall-reatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA) have tied·healthcare leaders in knots wondering how to meet the
specific requirements of cost-boosting regulations while responding to consumer
driven needs to reduce costs.
Against this backdrop, healthcare leaders must attempt to build support
for new ideas and ways to provide care even in the face of job insecurity and
changes that shake the foundation of all that has been considered sacrosanct in
healthcare for their entire careers. It is exceedingly difficult to see the types of
changes needed and build support for these changes, maintain high morale,
keep physicians happy and productive, maintain or even increase actual or
perceived quality, and decrease costs all at the same time.
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Attention must be paid to the underlying culture of the healthcare
organization if leadership is ever to be able to do anything other than acquire
compliance with new behaviors required of healthcare providers. It is insufficient
to be content with mere compliance, and the future must be built upon

commitment if we are to achieve the high level of cost effective excellence that is
demanded of the healthcare sector. The difference between workforce
compliance and commitment is important, because achieving commitment can
make the difference between success and failure in a cultural change initiative.
Commitment describes an outcome in which the employee internally agrees with
a decision or request fro,m a leader and makes a great effort to carry out the
request or implement the decisic!1 effectively. Compliance describes a different
style of buy-in where the employee is willing to do what the leader asks, but is
apathetic rather than enthusiastic about it and will make only minimal effort (Yuki,
1994).
But this raises many questions. How can true commitment be
engendered in an organization where the employees and physicians feel
threatened? What specific leadership behaviors are likely to bring significant and
positive change to the fundamental culture ... the deeply held beliefs ... of a
healthcare organization? Why are some organizations more successful than
others, even in the face of overwhelming market forces that would make
predicting their success counter-intuitive? Is it possible to measure the culture of
a healthcare organization, and, if so, how?
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If it is possible to measure the culture of an organization, or those types
of behaviors that point toward the level of commitment, satisfaction, and strength
of the organization's culture, then it should also be possible to measure how
certain expressed leadership behaviors might change that culture. Further, it
should then be possible to determine what specific types of leadership behaviors
lead to specific changes in organizational culture over time, and ultimately to
produce a terrfplate to help executives be more effective.
Leadership interventions affect culture, and this is revealed in the
literature review. This project is directed toward determining what leadership
interventions make a measurable difference in culture over time. Particular
interventions may be identified as key indicators of strong culture organizations.
The dependent variable is identified as the culture. The independent variables
are specific leadership interventions. (i.e., what specific actions did leadership
implement between the first [T1] and second [T2] times that the standardized
assessment was administered?). The general research model for this method is
shown in the following section(s).
Statement of the Problem
What is the effect of leadership behaviors on organizational culture?
Hypothesis #1 :

Leadership interventions can positively influence
organizational culture in a measurable form over a
longitudinal period of time.

Hypothesis #2:

Specific leadership interventions can be identified as being
key predictors of high cultural assessment scores.
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GENERAL RESEARCH MODEL

Organizational Culture
(T 1)

First Measurement Cycle
-- Employee Satisfaction
-- Employee Commitment
-- Strength of Culture

......

Leadership Interventions

Second Measurement Cycle
-- Employee Satisfaction
-- Employee Commitment
-- Strength of Culture

........

Organizational Culture
(T2)
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This literature review cites, critiques, compares and contrasts articles and
texts with four main objectives. First, it is intended to establish the concept of
organizational culture and its importance in the management process, its
credibility as a management issue, and further to illustrate that the established
importance and credibility is also reflected in the scholarly literature. Second, it
will be shown that, although there has been much written about organizational
culture over the past two decades, there have actually been very few empirical
studies designed to look specifically at particular leadership behaviors and their
hypothesized impact upon organizational culture, or indices of organizational
culture such as employee commitment, satisfaction, or strength of culture
measurements. Third, many examples will be discussed from the literature
illustrating different types of management interventions either recommended or
undertaken in an attempt to somehow alter, improve, or otherwise change the
culture of the organization under scrutiny. Fourth, the literature review will cite
articles and texts that support the design methodology of the study.
While leadership interventions may take many slightly different forms, they
can be shown to fall into five general categories: (a) restructuring/re-engineeringl
redesign or patient care systems; (b) TQM/CQI efforts; (c) human resources
interventions; (d) communications interventions; and (e) efforts at physician
involvement. Some of these five general types of leadership foci will be shown
throughout the literature to have several specific but different management
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interventions associated with them. This is especially true, for example, in the
case of human resources where there may be leadership interventions related to
compensation and reward mechanisms, new training programs, different
employee orientation activities, and new hiring criteria. The importance of
revealing these various forms of leadership interventions in the literature will be
discussed later in the methods section of this paper.

General Research on Culture: What is it? What does it mean to an
organization? Can it be measured?
Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) present a conceptual framework for
organizational culture as a system of symbols deterrnined by ambient society
and the organization's history, leadership and contingencies, differentially
shared, used and modified by actors in the course of acting and making sense
out of organizational events. In this case the individual "actor" is that employee
working within the organization and "ambient society" is the societal environment
within which the organization is located. They note that culture, like language, is
manifested in shared meanings and public performance, but it is individually
learned; and, there are considerable interpersonal variations in cognitive
structures as to how the actor perceives the culture. They note that an
organization, as a result of a unique blend of history, technology, and successive
leadership may sustain its own system of symbols and meanings that are widely
shared by the organization's members and, furthermore, instrumental in eliciting
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or rationalizing their commitment to the organization. Thus, they tie together
leadership, culture, and commitment.
The crux of Bettinger's (1989) work finds that, while some companies
have strongly positive cultures and others' are very negative, most organizations
exhibit cultures that are somewhere in between, exhibiting cultural strengths and
weaknesses. She holds that if one could identify the specific and key
components of an organizational culture, it would be possible to evaluate each
independently, identify specific strengths and weaknesses, and deal with each
strategically. This could enhance leadership's ability to create and sustain a
high-performance organization.
Bettinger (1989) identifies twelve key'components of corporate culture,
the first being attitude toward change-, noting that a positive leadership attitude
toward change reinforces the expectation of discovering creative solutions. The
second component is focus. In this sense Bettinger (1989) defines focus to be a
remarkable degree of consensus about goals and objectives. Companies that
have no focus display behaviors wherein different parts of the organization are
frequently going in diametrically opposite directions, adversely affecting
performance.
Standards and values are the third cultural components identified by
Bettinger (1989). She notes that strength and clarity of values are important
ingredients of an organization's culture and contribute to strategic focus.
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Fourth are rituals that support values. It is noted that the absence of
ceremony or ritual causes values to have no impact, and that rituals serve to
incontrovertibly reinforce what the organization's values really are.
Fifth is a concern for people. Although few companies would admit to not
having concern for people, such companies do exist. Bettinger (1989) notes
that, because the majority of companies profess concern for their employees, it
is even more obvious when those same employees observe policies or actions
that are perceived as reflecting a lack of sincere interest. When employees
believe that the leaders care about their interests, a high level of commitment to
the organization is the result.
The sixth key cultural component includes rewards and punishments.
This component has two foci, inctudingnegative and positive reinforcement.
While some organizations emphasize policies designed to ferret out negative
variances and criticize those responsible, the generally more effective approach
is to positively reward performance that supports the organization's objectives.
Interestingly, Bettinger (1989) explains that there does not appear to be any
relationship between high salaries and morale. The important issue to
employees appears instead to be one of equity. How much others outside the
organization are rewarded for doing the same work and how their compensation
relative to performance compares with others within the same organization are
the equity determinants important to employees.
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The seventh component is openness of communications. This study
urges that both internal and external communications should be thought of as
strategic, because their purpose is to help bring about the realization of
corporate objectives. The human assets are brought together for a common
purpose through effective communications.
Conflict resolution is the eighth key component. According the Bettinger
(1989) the organization's established pattern of dealing with conflict generally
reflects the approach of senior officers, and those actions tend to communicate
to the rest of the organization the proper or acceptable style.
Ninth is customer orientation. Bettinger (1989) claims that while most
organizations profess to be customer oriented, few actually are. If an
organization identifies weaknesses in. its customer orientation, it must change the
culture to move the organization in the desired direction. This must include the
design of effective strategies to address the inevitable resistance to change from
the employee work force.
Bettinger's (1989) tenth grouping of key cultural components includes
excitement, pride, and esprit de corps. It is observed that, in strong culture
organizations, there exists a tangible spirit of excitement and intense pride that
affects the employees. People enjoy their work, they actually have fun, and they
display pride in the organization. They understand the mission and are enthused
about their role in making it all happen.
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Commitment is the eleventh key cultural component. Bettinger notes
(1989), as will be discussed throughout this paper, that in assessing corporate
culture it is important to gain insight into the extent to which the work force not
only understands the vision, but also is committed to making it a reality.
The final component is teamwork. This is closely related to commitment,
and involves the extent to which all of leadership and employees ... but especially
senior level leaders ... work with one another for the good of the organization.
When individuals or work units operate from private agendas, it cannot possibly
go unnoticed, and resentment builds. Subtle forms of retaliation are initiated,
and the priorities of the organization suffer.
Beyer and Trice (1987) found that managers need to learn and practice
ceremonial skills, because rites are important activities in any organization. They
agree with Bettinger (1989) in this regard, and define a rite as "a relatively
elaborate, dramatic, planned set of activities that combines various forms of
cultural expressions and that often has both practical and expressive
consequences" (p. 6). According to their study, rites help maintain the continuity
of cultural systems, and managers must, therefore, pay close attention to
managing organizational rites so that they do not dampen or divert change
efforts.
Aurelio (1993) notes that reduced organizational commitment is an
indicator of organizational stress, and that increased organizational attention to
its values and core beliefs can mitigate the organizationai stress. This article
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suggests that administrators might benefit from attending to the values
inherent in their organizational cultures so as to optimize organization stress to a
level tolerable by employees.
Bice (1990) promulgates what he calls one inescapable conclusion: any
strategic vision must be sustained by the culture of the organization. He
indicates that culture is the primary determinant of behavior, and if the leadership
wishes to change the behavior of an organization and the people within it, that
organization's underlying culture must also be changed as a prerequisite.
He further notes that commitment from the chief executive officer is the
first and most important essential principle underlying cultural transformation.
The leader must make a multi-year hands-on commitment of time and resources,
and it is a duty that cannot be delegated. During this transformation, which
according to Bice (1990) can take five to seven years, continuity of management
is a distinct advantage. He also makes an important point about physician
involvement, indicating that it seems inconceivable that healthcare
transformation can proceed without physician involvement. Noting that key
physicians need to be closely involved in the effort, he makes the point that they
must have a direct voice in crafting the desired culture. The physicians have to
sense some type of positive benefit to their practice if they are expected to
support the cultural change.
Management experts urge healthcare organizations to systematically
identify their corporate cultures notes Eubanks (1991). She notes that while
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some healthcare executives believe that culture is difficult to identify, in fact, it
is not. The key is to make the process more formal and rigorous so as to render
the information gathered on culture more useful in effecting change in the
organization. The process should not be random or haphazard. One caution
offered by Eubanks (1991) is to be careful about misinterpretation of cultural
data stemming from gleaning the opinions of only certain hospital constituents,
such as the most vocal employees.
Fitzgerald (1998) identifies a core problem in changing organizational
culture as that of controlling the underlying values. According to this article,
although the management of culture has been determined as a needed
instrument for strengthening organizational control and producing improvement,
it is not possible to speak intelligently about changing cultures until it is better
understood how to change underlying values. He notes that values resist the
customary forms of investigation such as detached observation, classification,
and measurement. Values do not exist as isolated, independent entities.
Fitzgerald (1988) notes that while there have been tremendous improvements in
the products and processes of American industry, there is actually little evidence
nationally that cultural transformation rather than astute management was
responsible. Nevertheless, he notes that if it is culture that must be changed,
most agree that the process must at least start with top leadership's
reconsideration of its current values, and proposes that the bureaucratic
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paradigm of autocracy, individual competition, gamesmanship, and alienation
be replaced by a new paradigm of collaboration, commitment, and collegiality.
Mark (1996) observes a dearth of empirical studies in health services
literature directed toward the concept of organizational culture, and that
SUbstantive theoretical development of the concept of organizational culture has
occurred in the organizational journals rather than health services literature. At
the time this article was published, the author reported only twelve articles in
health services journals that exhibited empirical research on organizational
culture. None of the articles reviewed by Mark (1998) relate specific leadership
interventions with employee satisfaction, commitment, and strength of culture as
is done in this study.
Fleeger (1992) performed a study to assess the strength of various
organization and work unit ideologies and the extent of cultural homogeneity.
Utilizing a 15-item questionnaire the following were surveyed: (1) type and
distribution of cultures throughout the hospital, (2) how well nurses know and
follow the system of rules, (3) the overall culture of the organization, and (4)
whether the work unit culture is similar to the overall hospital culture (cultural
homogeneity). Results indicated that nursing cultures of two of the hospitals
operated in harmony with other occupational cultures and with the overall
organizational culture, thus displaying consonance. In the third hospital,
however, the culture of nursing was in conflict with the other professional
cultures and also with the organization culture, indicating dissonance.
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Characteristics of consonant cultures include: collective spirit, golden
rule norm, a single superordinate goat, frequent leadership/staff interactions, and
high cooperation between units. Dissonant cultures displayed mismatches
between professional and organizational goals, stronger union affiliations than
organizational, little staff representation on committees, competitive spirit, and a
"them versus us" norm (Fleeger, 1993). Conclusions as to leadership
interventions that lead to cultural homogeneity include employee involvement in
strategic planning, and planning job redesign and job enrichment activities in
stagnant departments.
Several pieces of the literature focus upon the subculture of the nursing
department as an important driver in a hospital, because the nursing department
typically comprises the largest number of-employees in the entire organization.
Goodridge and Hack (1996) determined that the achievement of real change in a
clinical setting relies on a selected nursing model that closely reflects the culture
and values of the specific nursing unit. Greater appreciation of the depth and
complexity of the nursing department culture was invaluable in providing
direction as to the conceptual nursing model selected for nursing units.
McDaniel and Stumpf (1993) also take the perspective of the nursing
department into account, arguing that it is important to understand the culture of
nursing service, because research has established positive links between a
constructive culture, the morale and retention of employees, and decreased
mortality of patients. They conducted a study to assess the organizational
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culture of seven acute care hospitals to build a background for discussing the
strategies to enhance patient care services. They make several conclusions,
particularly that analysis of organizational culture is fruitful for nursing service,
and is linked to challenges of empowerment of nursing staff and work redesign.
In weak hospital cultures, employees are not clear about norms that are valued
by the organization, and they lack a sense of shared expectations. The findings
seem to indicate that culture can highlight areas to target when attempting to
enhance the quality of patient care services.
Substantiation of the importance of organizational culture is the
established link between culture and morale, retention, leadership and
productivity, and high-performance nursing units, according to McDaniel (1995),
This study concludes that there is a positive relationship between constructive
culture and ethics work satisfaction. Nurses who believe that they are working in
a constructive culture report ethics work satisfaction. Ethics work satisfaction is
defined as opinions about one's work as it reflects participation in deliberations
or decisions, conduct in practice, as well as actions regarding ethics. Ethics
pertains to behavior with others and toward society. In a constructive culture,
one anticipates norms that reflect explicit messages and ethical values. More
effective communications and humanistic encouraging behaviors are also
anticipated in a positive culture.
Becoming aware of organizational culture by systematic means can be
valuable in helping choose strategies for implementing change and seems to be
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a watchword throughout the general cultural research literature. Caroselli
(1992) points out that the notion of organizational culture is a concept often
spoken af colloquially with less concern for intellectual worth. As is reflected
over and over again in the literature, however, Caroselli (1992) provides a series
of different components for assessment of culture including time orientation,
perceptions of innate goodness or evil, and relationships with people in authority.
Consideration of a group's time orientation gives insight into a set of rules
that the organization considers important. For example, one might ask: Does
change-af-shift begin on time? Does the group wait on latecomers? Are
latecomers sanctioned? Innate goodness or evil can be observed in the nurse
who seldom shares information or double checks a co-worker's data. On a
nursing unit this may take the form of one nurse "grilling" fellow nurses at
change-of-shift report.
Caroselli (1992) notes that relationships with people in authority are a very
significant indicator of a group's culture. Examples of how this can be assessed
include such things as whether or not everyone is on a first-name basis, or does
this depend upon hierarchical position? Can a subordinate speak with a
superordinate at any time that both are available, or is an appointment
necessary? Another example includes communication style. Does the culture
require one-way communication from the top down, or are staff members
encouraged to communicate with leadership on a regular basis?

20
Kazemek (1990) notes that research shows that leaders with an
interest in improving an organization's potential should focus on that
organization's culture, almost to the point of obsession. To do so requires
leadership to focus on leading, managing, and monitoring the culture. They also
suggest that the process of leading the cultural transformation can be learned.
The process of leading the culture by engaging in activities that direct and guide
the organization toward the vision held appropriate for success consists of three
steps. First is to diagnose the culture to determine if operations and individual
behaviors are congruent with organizational values. Second is creating a vision
or agenda for change that reflects the desired culture of the organization as
reflected through its values. Third is building support for that vision throughout
the organization.
A chief executive officer or department head cannot manufacture a culture
single-handedly, thus those values do not exist in the abstract or within one
individual according to Kazemek (1990). However, values are created, instilled,
and given meaning through the collective behavior and leadership of the most
influential people within the organization. Generally, these individuals are
members of senior leadership.
"Few people realize that the culture of the firm they are joining can make
the difference between success and failure. If the culture is too unfamiliar and, if
they are not adaptable, they may be fired or leave in disgust," explains
Macdougall (1986, p. 71). An example is noted of an Armed Forces officer who
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landed his first civilian position in a consulting firm. He was bewildered by the
diversity of duties and the lack of formal organization, left without giving notice,
and created a permanent blot on his record. This author notes that, while
participative management style may be a fashionable cultural claim, many
organizations still have autocratic supervisors who have not completely adopted
a style which, for them, is radically different from when they started twenty-five
years ago.
Pressures to understand the impact of current healthcare practices and to
solve problems related to nursing shortages, rising costs, and interprofessional
conflicts have generated an increasing interest in the role of culture in effective
care delivery (Klingle, Burgoon, Afifi, et. ai, 1995). They cite two critical
concerns regarding culture in the literature. First, how should hospital culture be
viewed, and second, how can the cultural construct best be measured? For
their study they developed the Hospital Cultural Scale (HCS), and note that the
direct applicability of the concept of organizational culture to hospitals has not
yet been successfully completed. They also note that there have been too few
studies that have simultaneously measured the perceptions of superiors,
subordinates, and consumers of healthcare services, and that data form all of
these sources involving several large hospitals allows for more plausible claims
about the generalizability of findings. This study is different from the others,
however, in that the authors advocate providing the HCS to patients as well as
hospital employees, and note that the consumers of health care may also
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provide valid feedback that may help predict the cultural environment
prevalent in a healthcare delivery system.
Mark (1996) reviews the research on organizational culture in the nursing
and other health services literature published since 1985. Although the concept
of organizational culture appears frequently in the popular management
literature, he notes in fact a dearth of empirical studies in both nursing and health
services leadership journals. Substantive theoretical development of the concept
of culture is recognized in the organizational literature, but not so in nursing or
health services leadership.
In exploring the theoretical construct of organizational culture, Mark
(1996) reports two approaches to the study of culture as something the
organization has or something the organization is. In the former sense, a
functionalist viewpoint, an organization is understood as a social system
exhibiting a variety of cultural attributes, whereas in the latter case, a primarily
interpretivist orientation notes that an organization is perceived holistically as the
cultural manifestation of a social system. In taking the functionalist approach,
interest tends to focus on understanding the relationships among culture,
leadership, structure, and strategy with the effort toward improving organizational
effectiveness or assisting management in the process of organizational change.
The interpretivist perspective focuses interest in the study of social significance,
or "how things, events, and interactions come to be meaningful" (Mark, 1996, p.
147).
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The first article in any of the nursing literature focusing on
organizational culture did not appear until 1986, and Mark's (1996) entire review
revealed only twelve articles meeting empirical research criteria through 1996.
The most prominent were Coeling and Simms' (1993) study and Coeling and
Wilson (1998, 1990) (as cited in Mark, 1996) describing a series of qualitative
studies on organizational culture.
The Coeling and Wilcox (1998, 1990) articles published the first reports in
the nursing literature in which researchers empirically examined the
organizational culture of nursing units. The authors defined culture as a ':set of
solutions devised by a group of people to meet specific problems posed by the
situations they face in cOlllmon" (p. 149). Operationally, culture was defined as
the work group's rules, "the behaviors ... that group members consider to be the
appropriate responses to given situations" (p. 149). Using participant
observation and an ethnographic approach, the authors contrasted two nursing
units relative to their working rules for telling others what to do, for following
common standards, organizing time, and for taking the patient's perspective in
implementing change. The researcher identified important differences between
the units regarding the rules that guided behavior, asserting that these
differences hold implications for leadership in the hiring of human resources,
orienting staff, implementing teaching strategies, and facilitating change.
Coeling and Simms (1993), (as cited in Mark, 1996) build on their earlier
work and argue that understanding a nursing unit's culture may assist in the
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processof introducing a new nursing practice model. They developed a
nursiflJjunit cultural assessment tool containing 50 different cultural behaviors
and rewed norms, rated on a 6-point scale. Examples of the norms measured
by the 1:Istrument include working in an efficient manner, use of individual

jud-gmemt, assertiveness, and competitiveness.
Shortell et al. (1994) (as cited in Mark, 1996) report the results of a

theorekally driven examination of the relationship between management
processes and a number of outcomes in 42 intensive care units. It was found
that -caregiver interaction, a scale taking into consideration measures of unit
culture~

leadership, coordination, problem solving/conflict management, and

communication related to a statistically significant reduction in risk-adjusted
length of stay, nurse turnover, higher evaluations on technical quality of care,
and increased ability to meet family member needs.
Mark (1996) concludes that without exception every reviewed article
characterized organizational culture from the functionalist viewpoint, that is as
something the organization has rather than the intperpretivist perspective as
culture being something that an organization is. It is further reported that none of
the articles examined by Mark (1996) considered culture from the interpretivist
viewpoint. No articles, for example, investigated the symbolic nature of culture
or of culture as a process. This begs such questions as how do cultural artifacts
become symbols and gain meaning beyond the literal? How do such symbols
serve some type of role in maintaining culture? How do employees learn the
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culture in the organization? How is culture internalized? Where in the
process of internalization is the individual employee or group likely to be the
most amenable to accepting change?
Green (1988) argues that corporate culture has been under recognized as
the key to corporate excellence as compared to the traditional explicit tangible
aspects of the organization such as structure, systems, and technology. More
specifically, the formal, rational, scientific models of strategy have come under
increasing criticism on the grounds that leaders cannot, or will not, behave in the
appropriate manner. While a carefully shaped strategy may make or break the
company, the corporate culture may make or break the strategy.
Top leadership and corporate culture are interchangeable terms according
to Marshall (1987), because what top leadership perceives as good will be
emulated by other leaders. Marshall (1987) goes on to describe that each
organization actually has four cultures: (a) perception and reality as seen from
the outside (two cultures), and (b) perception and reality as seen from the inside
(two cultures). The outside image is simply the picture of itself that the company
presents to outsiders as to how it wishes to be seen and function. The internal
reality is driven by how employees see the values and judgments which actually
control who does what and which to whom. The author notes instances of
businesses that portray themselves as having high social values and a culture
supportive of those values, but when placed under stress these actualities
diverge. Marshall (1987) argues that when these four cultures are closely
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aligned and homogeneous, they are of considerable use, but that even in such
cases there may always be at least a hint or image of a description of internal
reality saying, "Ah, yes, that's what they say it is, but the real road to success lies
in ... and then you can fill in anyone of a dozen modes of activity of greater or
lesser cynicism" (p. 37).
There are three distinct steps that Marshall (1987) recommends to change
culture based upon his experiences including: (a) performing a gap analysis
using one of the standardized cultural analysis tools to determine exactly where
the current cultures are; (b) make clear and explicit the values that will form the
foundation for the new culture; and (c) persuade, teach, and motivate staff and
management at every level to understand and embrace emotionally, not just
rationally, desired values of the culture and to endorse and support them.
A specific issue is discussed which, although Marshall (1987) considers it
in the industrial sense, may be interestingly applicable to healthcare, and it has
been discussed at least anecdotally in some of the other healthcare literature.
One of the troublesome areas that requires constant attention is that inhabited
by "the technologists", without whom almost any company would be unable to
function. But the technologists to some extent tend to pay greater allegiance to
the technical aspects of their crafts rather than the requirements of the company
culture within which they work. Skilled management must understand this and
work with it empathetically, but continue to find ways to keep the force of
committal to the company culture itself.
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Ogbonna and Harris (1998) focus on two aspects of culture, both what
it is and what it is not. Noting that organizational culture was presented as a
universal quick-fix solution to just about every problem and dilemma facing
leadership during the early 1980s, they present a series of arguments asserting
that organizational culture is not the same as organizational climate, power or
politics and cannot be viewed as unitary.
Schneier and Rentsch's study (as cited in Ogbonna and Harris, 1998)
summarize the distinction by stating that "climate refers to the ways
organizations operationalize the themes that pervade everyday behavior' ... what
happens around here ... ' while culture refers to the history and norms and values
that members believe underlie climate ' ... why do things happen the way the do'."
Ogbonna and Harris (1998) conclude with three points: (a) any change initiative
based only on head office values and perceptions is likely to be ineffective;
(b) there is an inherent difficulty in achieving an organization-wide consensus in
values because of differing subcultural frames of reference, and it may be more
successful to pursue policies that recognize the existence of subcultural
differences; and (c) organizational culture is in the eye of the beholder in that
culture is perceived to be different depending upon an individual's position in the
hierarchy.
Seago (1996) completed a descriptive, correlational study describing the
relationships among culture, work place stress, hostility, and nursing unit
outcomes, particularly absenteeism and turnover. Coeling and Simms (as
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quoted in Seago, 1996) studied 33 nursing units in three hospitals for a total of
607 participants representing a number of nursing specialties. Their results
indicate considerable differences of cultural norms for behaviors on different
nursing units in the same hospital, suggesting that innovation should be planned
differently for different nursing units in the same institution. Barron (as quoted in
Seago, 1996) argues that cost reduction efforts must take into account
organizational and nursing unit culture, and problem solutions should be crafted
to fit the individual unit culture. This study concludes that during times of high
stress and change, creating culturally sensitive unit-specific responses that
increase decision latitude of staff will positively impact absenteeism, moderate
demands on the staff, and decrease job" strain.
In a second publication Seago (1997) reviews selected empirical studies
of organizational and work group culture in healthcare institutions. First, she
concludes that the question of whether an understanding of organizational
culture is important in managing successful businesses has been answered in
the affirmative by numerous experts such as Kanter and Peters and Waterman.
Second, it is noted that, according to Nystrom (as quoted in Seago, 1997)
hospitals, unlike many organizations, have been characterized as having weak
or fragmented cultures, and this may be linked to the number of stable
subcultures functioning within a hospital. Finally, and with potentially
troublesome implications for leadership, there are various confounding
influences on nursing unit culture that may be beyond the immediate control of
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leadership such as physicians, union officers, staff members, patients and
families, and personnel from various other departments.
According to Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo (196) organizations as we know
them are the people in them, and if those people do not change, there can be no
organizational change. Changes in the technical structure of the business such
as in hierarchy, technology, and communications are effective only if these
structural changes are associated with changes in the psychology of
organizational members. These authors distinguish climate as being different
from culture in that climate refers to what the organization's members experience
whereas culture refers to what members believe the organization values. They
assert that climate and culture are interconnected to the extent that values and
beliefs (culture) influence their interpretations of organizational practices,
policies, and procedures (climate), and that sustainable organizational change is
the most likely when both the climate and culture change at the same time.
Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo (1996) point out that, because organizational
culture involves the firmly implanted beliefs and values of the employees, it rests
at a deeper level of people's psychology than climate. To that extent, culture
captures a less conscious, subtler psychology in the work place. As an example
the authors cite what they call "the old" General Motors culture as an assembly
line mentality where plant manages looked to new technology to improve the
assembly line and were rewarded for the number of cars manufactured each
day. "Conversations with plant managers and assembly line workers about what
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it was like to work there might have yielded comments like, 'They don't care
about quality or people here; they bring in these robots to get rid of people and
churn out more product,'" explain Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo (1996, p. 11).
This is contrasted with GM's Saturn model in which employees and
technology are combined to produce quality. A Saturn plant manager or worker
might say, "They think quality is crucial. Even I have been convinced by the
actions they have taken" (p. 11). This exemplifies the relationship between
climate and culture. In the Saturn operation annual bonuses are based at least
partially on quality rather than just the number of cars produced. These types of
practices and reward mechanisms (climate) make employees believe that
leadership

valuE~s

quality

(culture)~

The conclusion is that what top leadership

believes is a big part of what constitutes the culture of an organization.
The term "culture" should be reserved for the deeper level of basic
assumptions that are shared by employees in an organization, that operate
subconsciously, and that act in a "taken-for-granted" fashion in an organization's
view of itself and its environment, according to Schein (1986). He notes that an
examination of cultural issues at the organization level is essential to a basic
understanding of what happens in that organization, how to operate them, and
how they can be changed for the better. Like Rivers (1997), Schein (1986)
relates culture to strategic planning, noting that although many companies
develop what seems to make sense from a product, marketing, or financial
perspective, they are not able to implement the strategies, because they lack
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basic cultural assumptions. This type of cultural petrifaction seems to be a
recurrent

theme~

throughout the literature.

Another area of concern expressed by Schein (1986) pertains to the
failures of merg~9rs and acquisitions. He points out that when the management
of a company dt3cides to merge with or acquire some other company, it is
common practice to study financial strengths and weaknesses, market position,
management strengths, and other aspects of the business operation.
Unfortunately, those aspects that might be considered "cultural" are rarely
checked. The philosophy or style of the organization; its technological origins,
which may give clues as to its core assumptions; and its fundamental beliefs
about its mission and future are all relevant to the long term success of the
merger, but are often overlooked in deference to the aforementioned business
parameters.
Smith and Vecchio (1997) explore the construct of organizational culture
and relate it to strategic leadership. Along with norms, values, and social
structures, the authors note that certain aspects of the history of a company,
whether recorde!d or remembered, can playa very important role in maintaining
and enhancing its culture. The remembered history of an organization may
include symbols, sagas, myths, folklore and rituals, and these phenomena are
related to emoti()ns or attitudinal functions. They are also forms of organizational
control,

because~

circumstances.

they help guide people as to what they should do under given
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Like othE~r authors, Smith and Vecchio (1997) point out an interesting
paradox. While the effectiveness of an organization is strongly influenced by
assessments of members and leaders regarding "what works,t! and this
orientation can be a tremendous source of strength, this strong culture can
become a major liability when environmental changes call for substantial
changes in strategy. As was the case with Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo (1996),
the U.S. auto industry during the 1970's is once again held up as an example.
One industry executive summed it up: "We have diagnosed our main
chalJenge ... not as sales or manufacturing or cost problems, but rather as
cultural problelTls. Our problems have been mindsets and prejudices. I'm not
using these terrns in a pejorative sense; it's simply that everyone here knows the
decisions that had been made long ago. Those decisions, those prejudgments,
guided the organization. Very few questions were being asked. People had
stopped raising questions. And any questions that were being asked were
answered with responses developed years ago" (p. 496-497). More will be
considered about this aspect of culture as both a positive influencer or a
potential pitfall in the section of the literature review subtitled, Culture: A
Competitive Weapon or a Devastating Nemesis.
Reynolds (1986) discusses the meteoric rise and sudden descent into
oblivion of a Sihcon Valley computer company from the standpoint of a
professional anthropologist. His findings may be instructive for health care. The
company values document was two pages long and spoke to such thing as
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attitude toward customers and colleagues, style of social communication,
decision-making, and the working environment that the company wanted to
create. But the Illost interesting thing observed by Reynolds (1986) was the
disparity between the statements written on paper and the social reality of the
company. This resulted in an obvious disconnect, and employee skepticism
toward the official corporate culture was commonplace. The conclusion was that
a model of the culture must be close enough to the truth that it can be referred to
without eliciting

~;mirks,

but that does not necessarily mean that ideal models of

social relations eire irrelevant to daily life, or that cultural ideals are treated with
skepticism by society's participants. Culture, says Reynolds (1986) is not the
official system of values held up by management, but rather a range of shared
models of social action, containing both ideal and real elements, each layer
molded by the social context and the channel of communication ... the observed
behavior, the official document, things said in public, and things said in private.
Despite the growing recognition that mergers and acquisitions involve
both human and financial resources, few healthcare leaders really know how to
manage their own corporate culture, much less link it up with another institution,
and even fewer yet are inclined to talk about it, hinting that the process is
imperfect or too sensitive to even discuss, according to Sherer (1994). Ergo,
mergers and acquisitions invite poor performance leading to low staff morale and

•

productivity, high turnover, absenteeism, and widespread job dissatisfaction. A
recent study of 40,000 employees conducted by Human Resources Services in
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Chicago revealed that employee satisfaction with new policies declines an
average of 14 percent after mergers; perception of job security decreases 25
percent; and, 80 percent of employees believe leadership to be more interested
in company finances than quality (Sherer, 1994).
Trice and Beyer (1995) bring together various cultural perspectives,
mainstream theories, and empirical work from various disciplines on cultural
phenomena in organizations, and part of their work focuses on subcultures.
They argue that subcultures inevitably emerge from sets of multiple and
sometimes conflicting meanings that develop over a period of time within a
culture. Utilizing various overarching cultures, including managerial cultures,
within single organizations, they note that: (a) subcultures are a prominent part of
work life, but are omitted from most cultural analyses of work organizations, (b)
there should be a shift in cultural analysis from focusing on overall organizational
cultures to focusing on differences that produce many subcultures; and (c) there
needs to be greater emphasis on cultural analysis of how subcultures interrelate
and articulate with each other.
While some experts have described different types of cultures in the
literature, they still have suggested that managers use generic change methods
and strategies regardless of the type of organizational culture. Ouchi (as quoted
in Wilkins an Dyer, 1988) suggests a single strategy that leadership should use
in changing from one culture to another. Kilmann, Saction, Serpa, et. al. (as
quoted in Wilkins and Dyer, 1988) have authored readings on the subject that
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discuss a number of different strategies for change, but each is deemed to
apply to all cultures. This article questions the conventional wisdom that aU
organizational cultures change or can be changed using the same methods or
processes, and concludes that such views ignore cultural differences among
organizations in their ability to change, experience with alternative culture, and in
their interpretation of environmental events.
Gordon (1991) develops the argument that organizational culture is
influenced by the characteristics of the industry in which the company operates.
Therefore, organizations within a particular industry share certain cultural
elements that are required for survival. Additionally, this article links culture with
strategy, structures, and processes.·· Noting that industry driven assumptions
lead to certain value systems that are consistent with those assumptions, these
value systems then prevent the company from developing strategies, structures,
or processes that would conflict with the assumptions and be antagonistic to the
culture. Although organizations may choose different strategies and principles of
structuring, those strategies and structures must be compatible with or neutral to
the culture and not in conflict with it.
One of the reasons cited by Gordon (1991) that companies doing well in a
particular market can get into difficulty is because changes in competitive
environment, customer requirements, societal expectations, and behaviors
based on past assumptions and values are likely to be ineffective, thus the
company is likely to display poor operating results. Although such a situation
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creates pressure for change, the culture, conditioned by successful lessons
from the past,

rE~sists

that change.

Two final articles of a general nature consider culture in relationship to
implementation of CQI and to a specific hospital department. McGuire and
Longo (1993) liken accurately defining the human and organizational factors
required for the successful implementation of cal in health care as being
comparable to counting the number of angels dancing on the head of a pin.
They argue that the change occurring over the past ten years from a heavily
regulated, negatively reinforced and punitive quality assurance approach to a

cal approach has required organizations to define and establish a core set of
expectations about behaviors and values. In order to assess the progress of
7

how effectively the system s mission and values are achieved in the
organizational culture, it is necessary to utilize some instrument to measure the
opinions of employees. They developed an "opinionnaire" designed to measure
mission

effectivE~ness.

The opinionnaire provided a framework for leadership of

each facility to systematically measure how they have done and where they are
going in terms of the mission. The system's annual evaluation of the facilities'
executive

mana!~ement

teams is partially based on the extent to which they have

effectively implemented the operational mission plan as measured by the
previous year's opinionnaire. This process monitors the progress of how
effectively the mlission is being achieved in the operational culture of each
facility, but is done formally with a "home grown" instrument.
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Finally, the concept of organizational culture is related to a radiology
department by Ctowd and Davidhizar (1997). They report that the critical element
relative to change is the manner in which change is planned, implemented,
evaluated, and nnodified if the change is to be effective. The attitude of
leadership toward change, involvement of staff as the change is made, and a
feeling of teamwork are essential in effective change and the relationship of
change to departmental culture in radiology. They assert that researchers have
been reluctant to study organizational culture in an empirical sense, because
one has to imme~rse oneself in the culture to understand it, and few academic
researchers haVl9 the resources to spend a year observing the cultural setting
being studied. C)n the other hand, if one is an outsider, members of the culture
may not be willing to reveal all aspects of the culture. This opinion runs counter
to other journal clrticles indicating that it is possible to reliably assess
organizational culture with instruments having established reliability and validity.

Research Background on the Healthcare Organizational Assessment Instrument
(HOAS)
Maehr and Braskamp (1986) note that one reason organizational culture
has become a popular idea is that it addresses a question of concern to
executives ... hO\/" can leadership do anything to enhance the overall motivation
and productivity of people in the organization? They note that, although there is
no unified agreement regarding what an organizational culture is or might be, it is
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an established concept within the realm of social science theory and research,
and that there is a firm basis for establishing a working definition ultimately
proving useful in measurement and research. Their work indicates that culture is
properly viewed as a complex of norms extant within a particular social
organization or ~Jroup. These norms might be viewed as shared answers to
basic questions confronting the social group ... "answers" in the sense that they
reflect a response to problems confronted by the group, the people within that
group, and choic:es that must be made in organizing individual and group
behavior. They conclude that culture involves guidelines regarding what people
should strive for or aspire to.
It is possible to gather data through standardized questionnaires, thus
utilizing a psychometric approach to assessment of organizational culture, or at
least certain critical facets of corporate culture (Maehr and Braskamp, 1986).
They developed a series of questions about what was available to the worker in
the organizational context, focusing on incentives and their availability. This
evolved into the development of a set of organizational culture scales and an
assessment of organizational culture involving employee perceptions of the job
and with how thE~se perceptions, in turn, are related to commitment and job
satisfaction.
Thus was developed the Health Care Organizational Assessment Survey
(HOAS) in 1986.. The instrument measures, among other things, employee

satisfaction, strength of culture, and commitment. The HOAS developed by
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Maehr and Braskamp (1986) is utilized in this study to assess these three
characteristics in the studied hospitals and health systems. Some of the articles
reviewed for thi:5 project may have used other instruments; however, they point
toward the importance of culture as a determinant of employee satisfaction and
commitment and touch upon leadership behaviors as influencers of
organizational culture.
Why measure employee commitment, satisfaction, and strength of
culture? What

E~xactly

do these characteristics reveal that makes them important

determinants of leadership actions? Atchison (1990) describes these three
attributes as

thE~

"bottom line of human capital" (p. 84).

Commitnlent predicts retention and comes from shared values, loyalty,
pride, meaning, and ownership. Atchison (1990) explains that hospitals with
strong cultures have employees that enjoy high levels of commitment; further, if
employees commit themselves to an organization, they will also believe in it and
better understand it. "Only when an organization has a defined mission,
internalized values, and a clear vision are employees likely to say, 'Now that we
understand whatt we're about, we know how we fit in and we won't leave here'''(p.
84).
Satisfaction provides inSight into how well employees are satisfied with
pay, work, supervision, co-workers, and promotion opportunities (Atchison,
1990). They enjoy their jobs. It is important to note, however, that just because
someone is satisfied with his or her job does not necessarily mean they will also
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be committed to the organization. Satisfaction might not predict commitment,
but commitment: predicts satisfaction.
Strength of culture addresses whether or not employees believe that the
organization has done well at defining and communicating its mission (Atchison,
1990). A strong strength of culture indicates that employees believe the
organization to have a clear sense of direction (vision), they understand what is
expected of thern (values), and they see the organization as having a clear set of
norms and a strong sense of direction. In this sense the employees know what
really counts,
employees

a~Jreement

have~

on values is deep and pervasive, and large numbers of

a very strong sense of ownership in what happens in the

organization.

Corporate Culture: A Competitive Weapon or a Devastating Nemesis?
The suggestion that a positive corporate culture can help an organization
be tangibly morH successful dates back to ancient Greece, and it is still true,
according to Clemsen (1986). He notes that the idea of corporate culture was
created, not by some management guru, but by Percales, the father of Athens'
Golden Age. In a speech Percales made at the funeral of Athenian soldiers in

431 Be he sketched a picture of his ideal society, and it turned out to be one of
history's most powerful statements of the shared values and beliefs in an
organization ... its culture. Percales demonstrated that establishing a strong
corporate cuitUrt3 required a leader who could determine what made his
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organization different, and eloquent communication of those differences to the
organization's rnembers.
Barney (1986) discusses the importance of culture in explaining the
historically

supE~rior

financial performance of IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Proctor and

Gamble, and t\1cDonalds as focusing on the values and beliefs embodied in
these companies' organizational cultures. The emphasis is on use of culture to
gain a significant long-term competitive advantage over others. He notes three
conditions that I11Ust be met in order to maintain the high performance. First, the
culture must enable an organization to do things and behave in ways that lead to
high sales, low costs, and good profit margins, thus generally adding financial
value to the organization. Second, the culture must have characteristics that are
not common to the cultures of many other organizations. Third, the culture must
be imperfectly irnitable so that other firms without these cultures cannot easily
engage in activities that will change their cultures to include the required
characteristics.
Case studies and survey data are utilized by Denison and Mishra (1995)
to explore the

rE~lationship

between organizational culture and effectiveness. It is

also noted that organizational culture is found to be measurable and to be
related to important organizational outcomes including return on assets and
sales growth. E:xplaining that the relationship between culture and functioning of
social organizations has been a recurring theme for over 50 years, these
researchers determined that culture and effectiveness may be more closely
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linked in

lar!~er

firms rather than smaller. perhaps because the coordinating

effects of culture are more important in complex systems.
Martin and Siehl (1983) note that cultures can express conflicts and
address needs for differentiation among organizational elements in addition to
serving integrative functions. The example provided is the relationship between
John DeLorean and General Motors (GM)e Delorean headed one of the major
divisions for (3M, and developed a counterculture by expressing his opposition to
deference to authority through many means such as storytelling, changing office
decor, and allowing executives who reported to him to decorate their offices
within reason.:lble limits to fit their individual tastes. This had heretofore not been
permitted at GaM. DeLorean role-modeled a carefully calibrated willingness to
deviate from tile dominant GM culture of fitting in. He opposed demands for
unquestioning loyalty, and held up the Corvair disaster as an example of what
happens in terms of "group think" dangers.
"There \vasn't a man in top GM management who had anything to do with

the Corvair wh() would purposely build a car that he knew would hurt or kill
people. But, as part of a management team pushing for increased sales and
profits, each galve his individual approval in a group to decisions which produced
the car in the falee of serious doubts that were raised about its safety, and then

later sought to squelch information which might prove the car's deficiencies,"
said Delorean (Martin and Siehl, 1983, p. 62). In addition to ridiculing the
values of the dominant culture, Delorean articulated a different set of core
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values, objective measures of performance to subjective indicators of
conformity, preferring productivity to deference, and independence to blind
loyalty. They conclude that a counterculture can serve useful functions for a
dominant culture, articulating the boundaries between appropriate and
inappropriate conduct and as a safe haven for the cultivation of innovative ideas.
Medtronic Inc., is one of the world's largest therapeutic medical
technology companies, and the focus of a study by McKibbin (1995). The
company's success is based firmly on mission-driven values that are
nonnegotiable clnd universal, and the chief executive officer publicly speaks
about what he calls "the soul of the corporation." The belief is that there need be
no contradiction between'extraordtnary profitability and a values-driven corporate
culture. When

~J1edtronics

acquires other companies, corporate culture variables

are factored in v~hen evaluating those companies for acquisition. The company's
senior managenlent perspective is that corporate culture is made up of two
elements: values and norms. While it may be rare that leadership will be
successful in trying to change the organizational values of the merged company,
the cultural norn1S (the way people interact, the manner in which they work
together) can

be~

different. When Medtronics acquires another company, that

company has th '9 right to have different norms, but there can be no
disagreement on values. One of the benefits of this up-front cultural fit is a much
smoother integration of the two companies. This may be one of the areas that

44
has been overlooked in some of the recent healthcare mergers that have
ultimately failed.
Muller-Snlith (1996) points out that the very culture that may have to
undergo change to survive healthcare reform was the basis for past successes.
White management interventions such as re-engineering, downsizing, and
benchmarking are examples of common improvement efforts, those that are not
compatible with the existing culture are not likely to succeed. Muller-Smith
(1996) identifies four basic types of cultures, each with specific behaviors,
traditions, leadership styles, and management approaches. The four cultures
include: (a) control, characterized by impersonal interactions, decisions based
upon analytical, detached fornlulas, strict compliance with rules, a no-nonsense
matter-of-fact work environment; (b) competence, characterized by decisions
based on analytical, detached formulas relying heavily upon scientific process
with creativity fostered from a sound, rational process; (c) collaboration,
characterized by a people sensitive focus on concrete, tangible reality with a
highly participative can-do mentality; and (d) cultivation, characterized by a
personal people sensitive environment with strong emphasis on ideals and
beliefs, creativity and emphasis on empowerment. While each organization may
have elements of all four cultures, there will usually be a core culture that
emerges, and management must use this information to help direct the change
process as all of healthcare is being called upon to shift its delivery paradigm.
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McManis and Leibman (1998) advocate a more measured approach
toward considering corporate culture and what it can and cannot do for an
organization. This work cites an example in the form of Allen Kennedy, coauthor of a best seller, Corporate Culture. Shortly after writing his book,
Kennedy started up his own software company. Convinced that he was right
about the importance of corporate culture and intent on leaving nothing to
chance, he carefully defined values and articulated them to employees. The first
product was introduced seven months after the start-up in the form of a sales
and marketing software package. It was a high quality product with an extremely
high price tag, and it did not sell. The authors point out that the problem with
Kennedy's approach was that he concentrated so much on the corporate culture
that he neglected the corporate business. They conclude that, if managing the
corporate cultun3 becomes an end in itself rather than the context for business
decisions, then the business will still not do well. The organizational culture must
support the business, and in an unhealthy organization, the business strategy
defines one agenda, but the culture reinforces something different.
Many cultures, particularly those that develop into extremely strong
cultures, contain the seeds of their own destruction according to Payne (1991).
He notes that, vvhile it is important to pay attention to culture, and to be able to
change culture so that it is right for the time and the circumstances, those
leading the process must understand that times and circumstances continue to
change. Gener;al Motors (GM) is once again held up as an example by Payne
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(1991) as an orglanization that had a very strong culture that allowed it to be
successful for many years, however, leadership at GM became so insular and
convinced of the company's invulnerability they failed to realize that the injection
of relatively cheap high quality Japanese cars into the U.S. market was changing
market circumstances.
Penland (1996) agrees with Payne (1991) that without exception, every
organization produces a culture comprised of values, beliefs, norms, attitudes,
and philosophies that influence its ultimate success or failure. He notes that the
culture that resis.ts change and embraces the existing paradigms is the same
culture that inhibits progress. Leadership in this type of organization may
verbalize a desire to adopt a new system, but they have difficulty changing their
own personal attitudes in·order for the transformation to be successful.
Organizations studying the adoption of a Total Quality Management (TQM)
program should determine whether the current leadership is flexible enough to
empower employees to share in the leadership process no matter what their
hierarchical position in the organization. An organization may have to initiate
less costly prelin1inary steps prior to the TOM process such as educational and
developmental clctivities for leadership and employees designed to prepare them
forTQM.
Culture is an important component of strategic thinking and planning,
according to Rivers (1997). Since organizations are subject to cultural influences
from the environment, including other organizations, changes in the environment
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can have a major impact. Strategic thinking involves cultural and
environmental issues. It is also important to remember that culture is not
necessarily a rationally based belief system, but is emotionally dynamic. Kotter
and Heskett (as quoted in Rivers, 1997) examined the relationship between
organizational culture and performance in 207 organizations in 22 different
industries and concluded that there is a positive relationship between strength of
organizational culture and performance in the long-term. But Duncan (as quoted
in Rivers, 1997) varies a bit from this interpretation, arguing that organizational
culture can be a source of competitive advantage so long as that culture is
valuable and rare, and as long as it cannot be easily imitated. This is a very
similar concept to,the characteristic that Barney (1986) termed as "imperfectly
imitable" in a pn3viously reviewed article ..

Research on Change in Culture
Ritter (19 94) observes that the literature on organizational culture is
1

divided. Literature that popularized the concept of organizational culture
contributed by F>eters and Waterman, Ouchi, and Deal and Kennedy, maintains
that culture can be managed, and that good leaders can mold the culture to bring
about desired outcomes. But there are other writers who believe that culture is
an organizational force and is not subject to leadership control. Edgar Schein, a
major contribut()r to organizational culture theory, states, "The notion that
executives can come in and change culture is just a misuse of the concept and
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the term" (p. 11). Riter (1994) concludes that cultural change implemented by
management is possible, but it is a slow process that may take years to fully
implement. Unaierstanding the characteristics of the employee workforce, the
environment and the life cycle of the healthcare institution will provide guidance
to leaders as to the degree of change that is possible during a given period.
"The changes businesses are being forced to make merely to stay
competitive ... irrlproving quality, increasing speed, adopting a customer
orientation ... are so fundamental that they must take root in a companyfs very
essence, which means in its culture" (Dumaine, 1990). According to this article,
cultural change !must come from the bottom, but the CEO must guide it.
Employees haVE! been underestimated, -and one must start with the premise that
people at all

tevE~lswant

to contribute and make the business a success.

Dumaine (1990) outlines seven key points to organizational change. Point one
is to understand the old culture. A course cannot be charted for a new culture
until the current one is identified. As the other references indicate, there are
empirical ways to measure the old culture.
The second point is to provide encouragement to employees who are
resisting the old culture and help them derive ideas for the better one. Third is to
find the best subculture in the organization and hold it up as a good example.
Fourth, rather than attack culture head on, assist employees in finding their own
new ways to accomplish their tasks, and a better culture will follow. Fifth, do not
count on a clearly defined vision to work miracles; it only acts as a guiding
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principle for change. Sixth, plan to take five to ten years for organization-wide
improvement. Seventh, it is important to live the culture that you want, because
actions speak louder than words.
Another article that connects leadership to culture notes that culture must
be practiced, not preached. Two somewhat poignant examples are provided.
Cline (1988) nott3S the San Francisco area insurance executive who summoned
his management staff and informed them that one-third were being laid off
because of hard times. He then hopped onto his private plane and flew off to a
golf tournament at Pebble Beach. Another case involved a Silicon Valley
computer firm that declared a written policy indicating attention to detail as their
trademark; their goal was to do it right the-very first time. They intended to
deliver

defect-frE~e

products and services to their customers on time. But

everyone in the plant knew that defective computers were being shipped since
executives at

thE~

highest level did not want to miss announced release dates.

Although management said that it encouraged open and direct communication
as routine, the culture document itselfwas created in secret strictly following the
established chain of command. Middle management and line employees were
not consulted about the new culture statement until it was adopted. As a result,
everyone knew that the real values were hierarchy, secrecy and expediency, no
matter what any document said. That corporation is now out of business.
Bass and Avolio (1994) discern two types of leadership in regard to
changing culturE! in an organization. They note that, while an organization's
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culture develops from its leadership, the culture of an organization can also
affect the development of its leadership. They further distinguish the difference
between transactional Jeaders as those who work within their organizational
cultures following existing rules and norms, vis-a-vis transformational leaders
who change their culture by first understanding it and then realigning the
organization's culture with a new vision. Transformational leadership results in a
revision of the organizationJs shared assumptions, values and norms.
They notH that highly innovative and satisfying organization cultures are
those where transformational leaders build on assumptions that people are
basically trustworthy; everyone has a unique contribution to make; and complex
problems can and should be handJed at the lo\vest level possible. "There is a
constant interplcty between culture and .Ieadership. Leaders create the
mechanisms for cultural development and the reinforcement of norms and
behaviors expressed within the boundaries of the culture" (Bass and Avolio,
1994, p. 543). l"hey explain that behaviors of top level leaders become symbols
of the new culture, and thus stories are created around the leader and
mechanisms are! developed to improve upward communication.
Pieter van Donk and Sanders (1994) blame delays in implementing quality
management programs on top leadership and external consultants. Noting that
top leadership and consultants are often unaware of the basic issues and values
that support their organizations, culture is therefore the missing component.
Understanding t!he organization's culture is important. First, it is a starting point
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for formulating a quality management policy and selecting an appropriate way
to implement it, c~nd second, the investigation of culture from the perspective of
quality provides opportunities for activities in other management areas, such as
human resources management or organizational development.
Ott (1995) poses the question as to which comes first: cultural change or
different approaches to leading? He argues that both are important, but in
different ways. (:;iting Lee lacocca at Chrysler and Robert Townsend at Avis, he
notes that an effl9ctive leadership style in conjunction with the proper
circumstances can spur change in an organization's culture, but by itself, a
leadership style change cannot accomplish or maintain a cultural change.
Collins and Porras (1994) discuss what they call "cult-like cultures." In
studying such sLiccessful companies as Nordstrom's Department Store, HewlettPackard (HP), V\falmart, Proctor & Gamble, and Motorola they noticed that some
seemingly well qualified people simply did not seem to be able to fit in while
others did. Those who were not able to buy in to the Nordstrom, HP, Walmart,
Motorola, and Proctor & Gamble "way" usually left the organizations. They found
that an organization does not necessarily need to create a "soft" or "comfortable"
environment to build a visionary company. In fact, the visionary companies tend
to be more demanding of their people than other companies in terms of
performance and congruence with the core ideology. They compare joining one
of these companies with joining a very tight-knit group or society. If an employee
is willing to buy in and dedicate themselves to what the company stands for, then
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they will be pleased and productive, but if that employee does not buy in, they
will probably flounder, feel miserable and out-of-place, and eventually leave ...
ejected, as Collins and Porras (1994) say, "like a virus" (p. 122). They argue that
to simply say that visionary companies have a culture is an inadequate
explanation, because all companies have a culture, but they observed a much
stronger culture in the successful visionary companies.
The terms "cult" or "cult-like" are intended to be descriptive in the Collins
and Porras (1994) work and are not intended to be pejorative or prescriptive.
These authors found in an analysis of the visionary versus the comparison
companies the following cultural manifestations comparing visionary companies
with less successful comparison companies by pairs: (a) in eleven out of
eighteen pairs, tl1e evidence shows stronger indoctrination into core ideology
utilizing the history of the visionary company vis-a-vis the comparison company,
and the visionary companies placed more emphasis on employee training in
general; (b) in thirteen out of eighteen pairs, the evidence indicates greater
tightness of fit through the history of the visionary company than in the
comparison company, so employees tend to either fit well or they do not fit at all;
(c) in thirteen out of eighteen pairs, the research shows greater elitism to the
degree that then3 is a sense of belonging to something very special and superior
in the visionary companies, but not the comparison companies; and (d) looking
at all three dimensions of indoctrination, tightness of fit, and elitism, the visionary
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companies

havE~

shown greater cultism through history than their counterparts

in fourteen out of eighteen pairs.
In an exhortation to chief executive officers, Horton (1992) agrees with
Collins and Porras (1994) in his textbook The CEO Paradox, arguing, "The
company you have come to lead already has a corporate culture in place. But
one way or another, deliberately or not, you will influence it by your thinking and
your actions. And the longer you serve [as CEO] the more profound (for better
or worse) the cultural change will be. If you're still skeptical, then consider this:
The effects you have on the corporate culture of your company will inevitably ... if
slowly ... drop to your bottom line" (p. 101).
McNeese-Sm"ith (1996) reinforces the need for studies that examine the
relationship betvveen teadership ·behavior and employee productivity,
commitment and job satisfaction. Noting that studies of organizational
leadership have relied primarily upon the Leadership Behavior Description
Questionnaire XII (LBDQ XII) to describe leadership actions, and that the LBDQ
XII was develop,ed prior to 1963, McNeese-Smith (1996) asserts that this
instrument does not incorporate recent findings regarding the use of teadership
behaviors. She observes that in spite of the large volume of research on the
effect of leadership, she could find no study that has examined the impact of
specific leadership behaviors upon the outcomes of productivity, job satisfaction,
and employee cl:>mmitment. Other than this study by McNeese-Smith that shall
be reviewed her,e, this investigator found the same circumstances, thus one of
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the reasons for this study, and for the need for future studies which shalt be
discussed later in this writing.
The purpose of the McNeese-Smith (1996) study was to identify specific
leadership behalviors and to determine the relationship between the use of those
behaviors by hospital department managers and the productivity, job satisfaction,
and organizational commitment of employees. The hypothesis was that a
positive correlation would exist between specific leadership behaviors and the
three employee outcomes.
The conclusions of the McNeese-Smith (1996) study support the
existence of a positive relationship between a leader's use of certain behaviors
and employee productivity, job satisfaction, and commitment to the organization.
However, the correlation in the study was low to moderate, suggesting that the
leadership behaviors are only part of the influences upon employees. Since the
variance accounted for is relatively modest, it is important to note that all five of
the identified behaviors and the composite of the five behaviors are consistently
related to desirable employee outcomes. The findings support the use of certain
leadership behaviors to predict employee outcomes. The leadership behavior of
"enabling others to act" was the strongest predictor of employee job satisfaction,
second only to "challenging the process" in predicting employee commitment.
In terms ()f critical review of the McNeese-Smith (1996) study and its
applicability to this investigator's current study, the following observations are
made. First, although McNeese-Smith (1996) purports to study "specific
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leadership behaviors," these "specific" behaviors were defined as:
(a) challenging the process; (b) inspiring a shared vision; (c) enabling others to
act; (d)

modelin~1

the way; and, (e) encouraging the heart. This author would

argue that these are not specific leadership behaviors, and that a specific
leadership behavior might be one "layer" below these definitions. For example,
what exactly would one do to enable others to act? What specific things could a
leader do to "encourage the heart?" What are executives doing out there that
specifically produce results?
Second, tl:lese behaviors were studied in middle management level
leaders, not senior level leaders. This begs the question as to what specific
senior level leadt3rship behaviors or interventions might have an impact upon
employee outcornes such as commitment and strengtn of culture. Third, the
McNeese-Smith (1996) study only includes two hospitals, both located in Seattle,
Washington. So the study is quite limited in terms of sample size and diversity of
sample, and any sense of geographic diversity is lost. There is little doubt that
these limitations are related to the enormous complexity of such a study. With
over 5,000 acute care hospitals in the United States, operatioinalizing a sample
size for such a study of sufficient size and randomness to meet the rigors of
critical statistical standards would be extremely complex, time consuming, and
expensive. So, just as in the case of the McNeese-Smith (1996) study, this work
is limited to a multiple case study social sciences approach, but an attempt is
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made to slightly increase sample size and increase geographic diversity of the
participating organizations.

Restructuring. R1e-engineering. and Redesign Interventions and Culture
Lando (2000) points out that 1996 was a record year when 768 U.S.
hospitals were involved in 235 mergers, acquisitions, or other transactions where
there was a change of control or some type of transfer of equity, but in 1999
there were only '142 such transactions involving 530 hospitals. Moreover, Lando
(2000) notes that more recent activities involve reversals as previously
completed mergiers are unraveHng, and systems are selling or spinning off
acquisitions. "All of the healthcare leaders inteiViewed for this article, without
exception,

name~d

organizational culture as the single biggest determining factor

in the success or failure of a merger" (Lando, 2000, p. 9).
To keep factionalism in check a new culture must be built post-merger,
and the old culture must be recognized in order to take down the barriers to
building a new one. Lando (2000) notes one successful example as Owensboro
Mercy .~ealthcare System, which resulted from the merger of OwensboroDaviess County Hospital and Mercy Hospital in Owensboro, Kentucky. In that
merger situation, specific attention was paid to culture. A cultural design team
was assembled. and it included well respected, informal leaders within the
organization. A well-respected senior executive was assigned to a newly
created position to lead the cultural design team. Employees were formally
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surveyed to dete!rmine what values, behaviors, and characteristics would
make the organi:zation successful. Core commitments were distilled from these
responses. The cultural design team then suggested ways to operationalize
those core comn1itments. One example was a service recovery mechanism
whereby employees were empowered to directly incur expenses on behalf of the
organization to irnprove patient satisfaction. In this hospital the chief executive
officer commissioned baseline and follow-up corporate culture surveys using the
Healthcare Organizational Assessment Survey (HaAS). In the initial 1996
survey the

stren~~th

of culture ratings given to Owensboro Mercy were in the third

percentile as cornpared to the national database, but by 1997 the ratings had
risen to the 92 nd percentile (Lando, 2000).. .
The impol1ance of knowing the organizational culture through formal
assessment when attempting to engage in re-engineering is essential according
to Trahant and

E~urke

(1996). In assessing the organization's culture, the

process may create a "context of permission" in which people feel free to discuss
things that were never safe or polite to talk about before, but which affect
productivity, morale, and organizational efficiency in significant ways. Such a
process will help management determine if anything is getting in the way of the
re-engineering change objectives.
Serpa (19 89) notes that future productivity and profits depend on how well
1

innovation and e~ntrepreneurship are fostered in corporate cultures. Corporations
must change thedr cultures to create a climate that will improve innovation and
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stimulate a

more~

entrepreneurial leadership style. This will require a change

in leadership styJes so those leaders become entrepreneurs in addition to being
administrators. j:>ast aversion to risk taking, says Serpa (1989) must be replaced
by a willingness to invest in new technologies, new markets, and new products.
The conclusion is that leaders must encourage teamwork within function, across
functions and divisions, and between related companies, and like others, Serpa
(1989) recommends that rewards should be given for team as well as individual
performance.
Elmuti (1B97) discusses the importance of employee empowerment and
the use of self-directed work teams, noting that Fortune magazine has referred to
them as the productivity breakthrough of the 90's. Defining self-managed work
teams as groups, of employees with all technical skills and the authority
necessary to

din~ct

themselves, the team members are most familiar with a

specific aspect Clf the company. Stokes (as quoted in Elmuti, 1997) notes at
least eight good business reasons for an organization to adopt such an
approach: (a) reduced costs; (b) reduced workforce; (c) increased productivity;
(d) getting closer to customers; (e) decreasing layers of management
bureaucracy; (f) decreasing time to market for products or services; g) increases
in employee conlmitment; and (h) increased recognition of individual employees'
contributions.
There are! obstacles, however, in the process of implementing such selfmanaged work teams, and failures have made it clear that such programs should
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not be considered as a simple set of tools or practices (Elmuti, 1997).
Consideration must be given to the leadership style that exists in the
organization, because if the company already follows an autocratic style of
leadership, it will be difficult to integrate a self-managed team system. It is also
noted that trust is an important component, because if top leadership effectively
communicates with their employees, mistrust between ranks can be avoided.
Employees should be told the objectives for the teams, what benefits they can
expect to derive from playing a role, and exactly what will be expected of them.
Mallak and Kurstedt (1996) define the term empowerment, discuss its use
to change

organi~~ational

participative

leadE~rship.

culture, and differentiate empowerment from
They note thatgood leaders and good followers are

necessary for empowerment to be influential in developing an organization with
strong culture.
Participative leadership, according to Mallak and Kurstedt (1996) can take
many forms. Restrictive forms might simply involve workers on a shop floor
discussing operational issues and providing recommendations for management
consideration. Other more open forms provide employees some decisionmaking authority regarding their areas of responsibility. When organizations shift
to these more open forms of participative leadership, they start the process of
empowering employees. These authors also point out that an organization's
level of empowerment is related to its culture, and that a strong culture supports
the empowerment process in many ways.
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First, organizations with strong cultures provide clarity as to their
missions (Mallak and Kurstedt, 1996). Second, these companies minimize
mixed signals, because they have reduced the equivocality of communications
thus allowing management to speak with a single voice. Third, companies with
strong cultures have a central consistency that drives decision-making process
throughout the organization. This promotes consistency as to basic values and
beliefs. Fourth, strong culture firms help employees build "social currency"
based upon their knowledge and network of relationships. The social currency
helps build communication and trust, and allows them the power to accomplish
tasks independent of formal titles and granted authority.
Schein (as quoted in Mallak and Kurstedt, 1996) notes that once an
organization

deve~lops·a

strong culture and has stable top management, turnover

in lower ranks has little impact upon culture, because new employees can still be
thoroughly socialized into the organization. A high level of empowerment can
produce a strong culture, but leadership must understand that employees must
be ready for this step.
Arguing th;at empowered people change cultures, and that people become
empowered by learning about the organization and internalizing the
organization's values, Mallak and Kurstedt (1996) describe a four-stage
metamorphosis for cultural integration. At stage one, a new employee complies
with written polici,es and procedures in the formal organizational sense as a
condition of employment. The employee behaves in a certain way, because his
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or her job depends on it. The new employee simply follows the examples set
by others, beccluse he or she is not able to determine what is culture-consistent
behavior. They do not have the experience base to offer advice and feedback
as to what constitutes proper or improper behavior.
In stage two the same employee mimics the behavior of others who are
working in accordance with a set of organizational policies, but they are still
reluctant to intervene when observing culture-inconsistent behavior. At this
stage the empl()yee starts to internalize an accumulation of knowledge about the
organization's culture. The employee behaves in a certain way, because the
examples of others suggest it is the correct thing to do.
Stage three as described by Mallak and Kurstedt (1996) occurs when the
employee has developed his or her own routine of behavior and feels
comfortable enough to sometimes intervene when recognizing cultureinconsistent behavior. At this point the employee internally justifies actions
taken, based upon an understanding of the rationale behind the culture's values.
The employee behaves in a certain way, because it is right and the culture
supports it.
At stage

~four,

Mallak and Kurstedt (1996) describe the employee as

usually intervening when observing culture-inconsistent behavior, and will also
sometimes provide feedback for culture-consistent behavior. At this point the
employee has built up a wealth of knowledge about the organizational culture,
internally justifies his or her actions, and has become heavily reliant upon
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intrinsic motivators to guide actions. The employee behaves in this way
because it is rigl1t, the culture supports it, and furthermore, is now willing to
coach others to do the same.
Mallak and Kurstedt (1996) conclude that leaders who understand how
empowerment integrates with organizational culture are able to lead employees
through these four stages of cultural integration, thus helping them internalize
the values of thE~ organization. Employees then take certain actions for intrinsic
reasons rather than extrinsic reasons due to the new work environment.
The transformation of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
through massivE~ reorganization into a .more efficient, patient-focused healthcare
system is the subject of a cultural study by Vesta! (1997). It is observed that if
the VA is to achlieve rapid, sustainable transformation needed for long-term
success, it must change its culture from a rigid, functionally focused, commandand-control culture into an organization that values speed, flexibility, and
processes for dE~livering high quality cost-effective patient care. Several barriers
to this cultural change are defined including ingrained bureaucratic traditions,
constraints imposed by the federal government, scrutiny by influential service
organizations, and a Civil Service employee base that makes the usual human
resources management functions slow, unwieldy, and complex. Kizer (as quoted
in Vestal, 1997) describes it as " ... a culture of isolationism and introspection ... a
highly centralize~d, rigid, and hierarchical collage of independent medical centersU
(p. 340). The purpose of the article is to demonstrate the role organizational
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culture should p]ay in moving VA's structural and strategic changes rapidly
forward.
Vestal (1 B97) argues that various organizational experts have different
definitions of what the term "culture" really means, and that it is quite possible for
the term to be dE3scribed in a number of ways, many of which are perfectly valid.
What is important when an organization begins to study its culture is not so
much which definition is used, but that everyone within the organization uses the
same definition. The key attributes of the VA's functional culture, like many
organizations, are (a) being highly organized; (b) using proven methods to serve
existing markets; (c) maintaining clear lines of authority that respect the chain of
command; (d) lirnit risk; (e) minimize unpredictability of results, and (f)
maintenance of secure employment. .
The traditional, functional culture within organizations should not be
summarily dismantled, according to Vestal (1997), because some of the values
such as reliability, consistency, and individual performance continue to have their
place, particularly in certain departments such as finance and accounting,
however, chang l3s in the organizational structure and strategy will require the
adoption of valu13s and attributes of newer evolving cultures. " ... healthcare
organizations are quickly discovering that if they are to get ahead of the change
curve and stay there, they need to plan now for what they may be facing five,
seven, even ten years into the future. In short, to meet the stepped-up pace of
change, they have to be faster, agile, and able to react much more quickly"
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(Vestal, 1997, p.

:~47).

In order for organizations to remain competitive they

must create new products or services faster and get them to market more quickly
while at the same time looking over the horizon for the next business line, thus
they must become faster, flexible, and more financially agile.
These needs, Vestal (1997) notes have led to the creation of time-based
organizations that are achieved through restructuring, with flatter, leaner
management hierarchies, and cultures that emphasize the use of crossfunctional work groups focused on successful development of single products,
programs, or projBcts. The key attributes of the time-based culture as compared
to the functional culture are: (a) a high sense of urgency; (b) quick adaptation to
business environrnent changes; (c) capitalizing or. windows of opportunity; (d)
flexibility in thinking and approach; (e) pioneering new ways of doing business;
and (f) the ability to act despite uncertainty. South Carolina textile magnate
Roger Milliken (1 B92) describes this latter characteristic in his own company, a
recipient of the Baldridge Award, as "careful analysis with a bias toward action.u
This need for teamwork and cross-functional skills in a time-based culture
requires leaders clnd employees who are as flexible and agile as the organization
itself, argues Vestal (1997). "The recent annals of business are littered with the
remains of organi.zations that ... despite long, honorable histories, wellintentioned leaders, and committed, qualified work forces ... were slow, inflexible,
and ultimately done in by rapid change" (Vestal, 1997, p. 347). Risk taking,
decision making, and outstanding performance of individuals and teams should
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be sought-after values during hiring, and they must be instilled through
training and eduGation programs, and rewarded through performance and
compensation strategies.
All

organi~~ations

have curtures according to Shortell (1990), however

cultures have mclny dimensions. In order to succeed the most attention should
be paid to the cultural dimensions of content, adaptability, homogeneity, and
cohesiveness.

~;even

action steps are recommended for managing culture: (a)

constant environmental scanning to better understand demands of the
environment and what the organization wants to be relative to that environment;
(b) development of an ongoing program of action addressing the organization's
mission and values; (c) defining,and linking the mission, roles and objectives of
departments with the core values; (d) encouraging the development of
subcultures so ICing as they are not counterproductive to the overall culture
(Shortell [1990] compares this to recognizing different personalities within the
same family); (e) developing mutual dependencies among both individuals and
departments through use of task forces and committees; (f) emphasizing the
importance of trust and mutual respect over and over again; (g) making sure that
the organization's compensation and reward systems actually reward what
management says the culture and strategies are supposed to be.
Robbins (as cited in Nagaike, 1997) defines change as "alteration in
structure, technology, or people" (p. 65). Taking this a step further to look at
changes in structure, Nagaike (1997) explains that changing structure refers to
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any alteration in a structural variable including coordination mechanisms,
authority relations, job design, and degree of centralization. Restructuring in an
organization results in change in terms of its degree of complexity (the amount of
differentiation in an organization), formalization (the degree to which an
organization reliE!S on rules and procedures to direct employee behavior), and
centralization (concentration of authority in upper management).
Another example of structural change is an introduction of a flatter or
horizontal organization, and the cutting of management levels to change the
traditional pyramid-shaped hierarchy. This type of restructuring has resulted in
business-process redesign and less bureaucratic decision making, according to
Nagaike (1997), hut also requires goal-oriented team concepts which include reengineering, multiple skills instead of insular specialized skills, a customer-driven
performance, and an appropriate reward system. Nagaike (1997) further
describes other cJ1anges in the form of shifts from functional structures to matrix
organizations, a olesign that assigns specialists from functional departments to
work on one or more projects led by a single project manager. This might be
useful for functional specializations to increase accountability.
Other types of structural changes reported by Nagaike (19~) include the
move to product line management (PLM), which aims a marketing, planning,
implementing (orgianizing, directing,

con~rolling),

and

~valuating

the product line

at the same time quality and cost-effective car~ is provided. Related products
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are grouped to provide a comprehensive, coordinated approach to service
provision.
There are other changes occurring in healthcare that are not so much
structural in terms of changes in the organization, but changes in human
resources and utilization of them. Hospitals are looking to be able to increase
flexibility in expanding and shrinking workforce in response to inpatient and
outpatient clinical flow, since no one can continue to afford to staff to the
maximum level in the off chance that clinical throughput will warrant that level of
staffing. Nagaike (1997) reports that hospitals prefer to provide continuing
education and cro:ss-training to existing staff, preparing nurses to function
effectively in more than one area, splitting division responsibilities rather than
working on one unit and one llnit only" Nurses can be reorganized into flexible
resource teams and become a group of employees who have no specific longterm unit

assignmE~nt,

thus experiencing changes in roles depending upon

patient flow and organizational need, and immediately providing flexibility to
respond to demands.
A final area of change noted by Nagaike (1997) involves t.he recognition
and rewards system. Noting that these are relatively new concepts in
healthcare, they are nevertheless important, and he concludes that more studies
need to be conducted on the use of incentives in healthcare organizations. More
will be discussed on this issue in the human resources and culture section of the
literature review.
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Nursing

re~searchers

and executives have published much of the

literature pertaining to organizational culture, because organizational culture is
thought to have such an interactive relationship with the provision of patient care
services. An eX8lmpie of this is the work by Jones, DeBaca and Yarbrough
(1997) looking at organizational culture assessment before and after
implementing patient-focused care. These studies exemplify the degree of
thought being provided to organizational culture issues in the daily operation of
hospitals. In this particular study the authors conclude that administration of a
baseline multi-disciplinary cultural assessment prior to any change effort
(particularly in evaluation or redesign of nursing units) is essential to success in
any work redesign effort. They advocate that training efforts be directed toward
effecting the desired changes in perceived norms and values. Values noted as
predictive of greater change readiness include high teamwork values, flexibility,
and recognition of external market related realities. Values found to be
problematic include a reactive orientation with hierarchical values, a command
and control orientation, and excessive reliance on rules. They conclude that
shared governance is a predictor of success and that greater difficulties in
change managernent should be anticipated in both unionized systems and
academic health center settings.
Harrison clnd Pietri (1997) studied the use of team building to change
organizational culture. The organization involved was a manufacturing company
with a traditional leadership style, very dependent upon controls and sanctions to
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achieve results. The team building exercises included forming groups of
managers organized into functional teams. The teams included managers and
supervisors

fro~n

various organizational levels. Team building meetings were

held where the iteams were responsible for working with data sets to find problem
solutions and develop formal presentations made to top leadership. Two
subsequent tea'11-building exercises were implemented using slightly different
types of exercises. Anecdotal data indicated that managers displayed
participative leadership behavior that was nonexistent prior to the exercises. In
fact, the most te!lIing indication of culture shift was the willingness of senior
management to support organizational change through voluntary retirements
and reassignments of managers who rejected the participative leadership style.
Other indicators included promotion to key positions of employees whose styles
reflected a

more~

participative leadership; development of a managerial

performance appraisal system that includes an assessment of managers'
participative styles, support of the use of participative style by line supervisors;
and, company-v/ide documentation and publicity of successful efforts.
Grzyb-Wysocki and Enriquez (1996) studied a three-year patient carerestructuring project at University Medical Center in Tucson, Arizona. Patient
care managers 'faced many new challenges in the patient care services areas
dealing with chalnges in professional practice and the introduction of multi-skilled
workers. They identified the influence of existing organizational culture on the
restructuring as an important factor to assess early into the project to ensure

70
successful change, and conclude that the need for a humanly satisfying
culture is evident. It is leadership the plays an important role in leading the way
in cultivating this culture through specific actions that motivate staff to perform to
the highest measure of competence, take risks, adapt to change, make
decisions, work as a team, and to be open with information.
Organizational culture is recognized as a topic of current interest in
management circles, and many organizations are adopting culture-based
strategies such as TOM and customer service in pursuit of a competitive edge
according to Langan-Fox and Tan (1997). This is an article written by two
researchers fronl the Department of Psychology at the University of Melbourne,
Victoria, Australia; therefore the study includes a large Australian government
business enterprise, but the construct is still instructive in terms of leadership
interventions and the relationship to organizational culture. The actions they
recite are similar to those in the United States' healthcare system. They note, for
example, the types of significant organizational changes in Australia's top 300
companies between 1990 and 1993 as downsizing and restructuring (66
percent), quality management and customer service initiatives (28 percent), and
general workforce changes (22 percent). They also report that academics have
recommended that organizational culture should be considered during periods of
change such as mergers and acquisitions, growth or downsizing phases, and in
periods of conflict or diversification.
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A study by McDermott, Laschinger, and Shamian (1996) used Kanter's
Structural Theory of Organizational Behavior to examine the relationship
between

empo~/erment

perceptions of nurses and their commitment to the

organization. Organizational commitment has been found to be inversely linked
to employee turnover, intent to leave, and tardiness. Some evidence is noted
that links organizational commitment with superior job performance. The authors
offer a number ()f strategies for creating more empowered work environments.
Job redesign that increases the availability of structural power is one
recommendation (McDermott, Laschinger, and Shamian, 1996). Other
mechanisms include: (a) redesigning care systems to focus on a specific patient
population; (b) increased visibility of nurse managers providing clinical nurses an
opportunity to df3monstrate their clinical expertise and be recognized for their
skills; (c) deployment of staff to other jobs rather than cutting staff during
downsizing; (d) providing opportunities for nontraditional career moves and
options such as cross-functional programs, project teaming, and special task
forces; and (e) job exchange programs with other areas in the organization.
Alpander and Lee (1995) note that downsizing, restructuring, reengineering, str;ategic alliances, pay for performance, cost cutting, and the
creation of virtual companies and employees through Internet technology are,
among other

mCl~agerial

actions, examples of efforts that companies implement

in order to try and maintain their competitiveness. They also indicate that
adopting programs such as TOM and re-engineering to an organization without
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some general strategy tying them to the long-term corporate goals seldom
leads to favorable results. The article describes an integrated organizational
development program and its application to the Bangor Hydro-Electric Company
in Bangor, Maine. This project was undertaken in order to change the
company's culture, structure and operating procedures to create an environment
where proactive behavior toward change became the norm rather than reactive
opposition to change.
Described in detail are leadership actions that were taken in an effort to
change the culture of the company so that the employees embraced change.
Examples of sueh leadership interventions include managerial and supervisory
training progralTls directed at providing skills needed to function within an
adaptive organization (Alpaner and Lee, 1995). Other management
interventions included a new performance evaluation and reward system,
implementation of project teams to accomplish common goals, and a
management skills component focused on effective communications of the
strategy, culture and teamwork concepts.
Ferrara-Love (197) advocates that healthcare organizations heed lessons
from other businesses and industry in terms of the relationship between
changing organizational culture and the management interventions of work
redesign and restructuring. Noting that much of what healthcare leaders need to
know to survive change has already been initiated or completed in the corporate
sector, and if he·althcare executives do not redesign how care is delivered and
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how to keep the lid on costs, the government an insurance companies will do
the redesigning. Organizations fail in their attempts at work redesign and
restructuring, because leadership attempts to implement them by changing only
employee attitudes rather than the underlying culture of the organization. Once
the culture has been changed to accept the new paradigm, it can be used to
continue other changes in the organization.
Boston (1995) cites a survey conducted by Hospitals and Health Networks
focusing on patient-focused care projects in which approximately one-half of all
responding healthcare organizations reported major work redesign projects
either underway or in the planning stages. But she points out that notably
absent in these surveys are definitive answers regarding strategies to ensure
long-term changes in jobs, processes, and systems. Linking patient-focused
care to culture, it is explained that, while it is easy to implement a patient-focused
care program, it cannot be sustained if the core culture of the healthcare
organization is not changed to internalize, operationalize, and maximize the
program by all employees throughout the organization. Concluding that
transformation to patient-focused care is more than just the redesign of jobs,
systems, and processes, she explains that successful transformation requires a
change in work culture and the various elements that contribute to "the way we
do things around here" (Boston, 1995, p. 20).
Bice (1990) discusses the relationship between culture and restructuring
of the organization. Recognizing that many organizations undergo restructuring,
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and many succeed in changing their shapes, few actually achieve the
important goal of altering employees' behavior; thus, the end result is that little
real change happens. He postulates that the reason restructuring brings about
desired change so infrequently is that management fails to place a great enough
effort into aligning the organization's culture with the new structure. Explaining
that restructuring must be done in concert with leadership interventions in
training and reward mechanisms, the lack of careful attention to the cultural
changes required by the new design will cause it to fail, thus compromising

leadership credibility.
While many of the scholarly articles in the field seem to be devoid of any
discussion of the medical staff involvement in cultural aspects of the
organization, Bice (1990) implicates the medical staff as an important component
of any redesign of a healthcare organization's structure and culture. Explaining
that most staff structures are process driven, they rarely permit continuity of
clinical leadership. Leadership continuity and a vision that is shared by both
physicians and management will be essential for success.

More will be

discussed about culture and physician involvement later in this paper.

TQM/CQllnterventions and Culture
Westbrook (1993) relates organizational culture to TOM noting that it is in
fact one of the few aspects of TOM that is the responsibility of leadership.
Everything else is a partnership. He concludes that, if an organization wants to
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adopt TOM as a guiding principle, it must begin with an effort by leadership to
build a supportive culture. Positive contributions must be rewarded and
negativism must be crowded off the agenda.
Lewis (1996) argues that, while TaM has separate origins from the culture
movement, the two fields have converged under the premise that to achieve
excellence and quality, it is necessary to deal with the issue of culture in the
organization ... either to change it, or determine if current culture will allow TaM
to be effective. Noting that the current culture change literature concentrates on
advice to leaders on how to achieve participation, teamwork and empowerment
of workers, they assert that leaders' knowledge of leading the organizational side
of change may be sound, but their knowledge of leading the people involved in
the change could be poor. Citing numerous case studies purporting to
demonstrate successful cultural change, Lewis (1996) observes that, almost
without exception, authors of these studies reject power-coercive strategies for
effecting change.
Kim, Pindur, and Reynolds (1995) note that, while much has been written
about the need for TaM and related strategies, few empirical and theoretical
studies have been completed or published on the connection of organizational
culture to the implementation of TOM. Numerous leaders in the field have
asserted that organizational cultural change will be required to ensure the
success of TQM. They conclude that specific cultural changes that must occur
prior to a successful implementation of TOM include an empowerment of all
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personnel and change in individual attitudes toward work.

Leadership has to

provide a supportive culture of team building, openness, and commitment for
quality and improved productivity. Adoption of TOM represents different sets of
human resources leadership principles. The concept of the team is important in
successful TOM implementation, and if a performance appraisal system is going
to be used to increase group cohesiveness, then it must be perceived as a
leadership device directed toward improvement and innovation rather than
punishment. They recommend a performance evaluation based upon team
results rather than individual efforts for TOM to be successful.
Carmen, Shortell, Foster, et. al. (1996) report the findings of an analysis of
the implementation of TOM or cal programs in 10 hospitals and relate those
findings to organizational culture. These researchers determined that an
empowered work force will create greater outcome gains in

cal.

A non-

hierarchical culture served as an intervening variable between the elements of

cal

implementation, and in the case of clinical emphasis, positively impacted

clinical outcomes. Interestingly, however, this study indicated that the influence
of culture and quality improvement outputs on overall business performance was
not as great as anticipated. Culture influenced patient satisfaction scores, but
not market share or economic efficiency. However, the authors also note that it
is quite likely that CQI simply had not had sufficient time to influence economic
performance. It is counter-intuitive that cal would have a positive impact on
patient satisfaction without some concomitant longer-term affect on market
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share. They further conclude that, with the environmental influences on
economic performance so strong in health care today, a successful COl program
should permit survival and some improvement in efficiency and market share,
but such effects are probably not going to be evident in the first year or two of
the process.
A study of lessons learned by the Texas Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) as it began the move of its entire agency culture
toward a TOM model is presented by Rago (1996). Arguing that proponents of
TOM such as Deming, Imai, and Townsend recommend that the key to
successful implementation must begin at the top of the organization and be
directed downward with constancy of purpose, Raga (1996) asks what it means
to "begin at the top," and questions the significance of this exhortation in relation
to the everyday behavior of the organization. He conducted a force field analysis
contrasting the major forces driving the TOM transformation process at the
senior management level at the TDMHMR and found that: (a) the lack of
infrastructure capable of supporting the TOM changes serves as a significant
barrier; (b) these insufficiencies take the form of lack of ownership and
consensus in the mission and vision for the agency resulting in personal
struggles; (c) personal struggles are waged in terms of people not having
enough time to participate in meetings, discomfort in addressing issues in
meetings, and the perceived success of leadership activities; (d) lack of
consensus for decision making regarding the strategic plan; (e) poor systematic
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policy integration; and, (f) lack of preparedness to assume the responsibility
that is associated with empowerment or understanding as to how empowerment
works. Rago (1996) seems to agree with Payne (1991) in that many strong
cultures actually contain the seeds of their own destruction. As Raga (1996)
puts it, "the major barriers to transforming the organization are, in actuality, the
pillars upon which the old culture was built. This makes change difficult and
personal" (p. 234).

Human Resources and Communications Interventions and Culture
Ernest (1985) links corporate culture to effective planning, pointing out
that planning within organizations typically focuses on the external environment
alone with little 'attention to organizational strengths and weaknesses. The
cultural dimension is a major component in organizational success, and effective
business planning whether it be strategic, organizational development or human
resources, demands an understanding of both the external competitive
environment and the internal corporate culture. Ernest (1985) explains that
inSight into an organization's culture can be found by examining "artifacts" of that
culture such as company policies, employee greeting, dress, language, tales of
the founder or other "heroes," ceremonies, and even gossip and jokes.
A number of leadership actions are suggested by Ernest (1985) as having the
ability to aid in changing the organizational culture. Under the banner of human
resource planning are the specific areas of employee selection and orientation.
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Just like Collins and Porras (1994), Ernest (1985) notes that seemingly well
qualified individuals often do not work out and blames this on the employee's
needs, interests, and personality as being incongruent with the culture, rather
than any lack of requisite skills. This means that, at the time of selection, careful
consideration must be given to assessing the candidate's style and determining
whether or not that style fits the culture.
In addition to these suggested changes in selection and hiring practices, a
second area of interest is employee orientation. The orientation process helps
ensure that critical beliefs, values and philosophies will endure. Examples are
provided of companies with strong cultures such as IBM and Proctor & Gamble
that have orientation programs gear.ed toward instilling specific values into new
hires that are necessary to sustain the company's culture. These programs
focus on experiences that instruct the basic values and rewarding behaviors that
reflect those values.
A third important area of management intervention is compensation.
Salary systems, says Ernest (1985) must fit the culture of the company. Use of
cost of living adjustments versus increases tied directly to performance will
depend upon what type of behavior the organization seeks to develop. Flat
increases or set ranges for given performance levels might be most effective in
maintaining ongoing employee behaviors in a functional culture, however in more
entrepreneurial cultures, bonuses or individual incentives may be more
successful in supporting individual initiatives. Other situations might call for the
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design of incentives that reward group efforts or productivity improvement.
O'connor (1995) studies healthcare change from the perspective of changes in
service quality as a new orientation. He concludes that, while the identification of
obliging and courteous employees is critical to any organization, it is especially
so for healthcare organizations, because the field is in a hyperturbulent and
competitive environment. "Research into the service orientation construct,
particularly in terms of measurement and its relationship to meaningful clinical,
psychological, and organizational variables is important because it can
potentially improve the process of personnel selection and help target
recruitment efforts" (O'Connor, 1995, p. 549).
Galpin (1996) noted that employers seeking effective change must apply
pertinent cultural levers to implement and measure their plans. Among the major
components or levers, which Galpin (1996) calls "cultural screens," are included
training, rewards and recognition, communications, and organizational structure.
Examples of specific interventions within these four cultural screens or levers
include elimination of communications that reinforce the old way of operating,
replacing it with communications that reinforce the new way of operating;
elimination of training that reinforces the old way of operating and replacement
with training that reinforces the new. Establishment of an organizational
structure that will reinforce operational changes is an example of an intervention
that is necessary for effective change.
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Weiss (1998) notes the importance of employee orientation, employee
training or cross-training programs, and work teams building employee
commitment. He advocates that leadership see every new employee the first
day on the job, explaining that the first day has a major impact on the new
employee's future morale, security, and productivity. Impressions of the
organization, co-workers and the workplace environment are regular byproducts
of the orientation process. Cross-training to allow employees to do their fellow
workers' jobs will help those employees better understand how the department
operates and offers the organization some protection in the event of unexpected
absences or other emergencies. The creation of work teams according to Weiss
(1998) is an excellent way to empower employees.
Wilson (1989) describes five factors that are critical to a high-performance
work culture: (a) a shared sense of mission or purpose that answers questions
such as what is expected of employees, what does the company do, and why is
it done; (b) delineation of clear and attainable goals which help people perform
best; (c) provision of frequent objective feedback so that people learn quickly
and work well knowing how they are. doing; (d) positive rewards for appropriate
or approximate performance which works in such a way as to catch people doing
something right and letting them know about it; and (e) provision of timely
support and assistance when requested or needed.
In healthcare the dominant culture has been bureaucratic, with status quo
maintained through traditional hierarchical structures (Understanding Culture,
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1995). Research on hundreds of corporate mergers in the United States
indicates that organizational culture is the single most important factor
determining whether an organization can adapt and survive. Culture answers
the basic need for felt order or control over an unpredictable environment.
Information is a source of order and structure, and by forming internal
communication mechanisms as early as possible, leaders can reduce anxieties
and control rumors, some of which will be sparked by outside media. While
some managers erect a shield of confidentiality assuming they can avert fear
and misinformation, experience proves that such shields actually create an
information vacuum where rumors take root. Communication systems can take
many valid forms. Although direct forms such as speeches, announcements,
and articles in the house newsletter may be effective, it is important to remember
that indirect communications such as ceremonies, logos, stories, and rituals that
facilitate transformation to the new culture are also useful.
Shockley-Zalabak and Morley (1989) study the relationship between
communication and culture. Schall and Goodstein (as quoted in ShockleyZalabak and Morley, 1989) explain that cultural messages teach organizational
members about what should be expected from others and what is likely to be
expected from them. Based on the values of the organization, these
expectations are thought to influence all communication processes by becoming
the context for providing meaning to everything that occurs. Cultural messages
become the key concern of management and employees, in-group meetings,
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training programs, and in written communication. These exchanges generate
shared realities that become the operating reality of the organization. They
conclude that culture has a potentially powerful impact on the organization, and
there is an interrelationship among culture and complex communication
processes.
Proenca (1995) examines the relationship between outcomes
management and organizational culture, introducing the concept of information
culture. He argues that one of the most reliable ways to implement informationbased initiatives such as outcomes management, is to change the organization's
information culture. The information culture is defined by the values and
behaviors embraced by organization members pertaining to the acquisition,
sharing, and use of outcomes information. In order to change the information
culture, Proenca (1995) concludes that major changes in recruitment and
selection procedures, communication practices, reward and compensation
systems, and leadership styles are necessary.
Trust is the key to acculturation in healthcare organizations according to
Johns (1996). Trust is appearing more often in management literature as one of
the most critical elements in organizational culture related to performance. Prior
to 1930, the traditional relationship between leadership and employees was a tall
pyramidal structure wherein leaders assumed that employees were not
trustworthy; thus, rigid bureaucratic structures were developed which included
strict methods of control. Later management literature reflects that self-direction
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and self-control are feasible if employees are committed and if commitment to
objectives is related to rewards for their achievement. In fact, it has been
learned that employees have considerable imagination, creativity, and ingenuity
that is underused by management. Mutual trust between leaders and
employees underlies this leadership paradigm, and for changes to be effectively
implemented for the long term, sustained trust must be part of the organizational
culture.
Commitment is also important, and results indicate that commitment is
associated with positive organizational outcomes, and trust is a requisite for it.
There are different types of commitment, however, and that which occurs due to
identification with the organization, internalization of organizational values, and
an economic exchange of work for pay is superior to commitment resulting only
from economic exchange without personal attachment. The latter has a negative
relationship with desirable organizational outcomes.
Effective communication is essential in organizations, especially those
undergoing crises and rapid change (Johns, 1996). Better performing
organizations usualJy have cultures that promote ongoing and open
communication. Full communication is the result of organizational policy and
behavior that begins at the top of the organization and extend to the lowest
levels.
Janson (1998) studies the ability of directors of nursing to alter culture in a
hospital setting, explaining that nursing directors can exert influence or change
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by continuously rewarding desired patterns of behavior. Leadership must
develop ways to reward productivity through peer evaluation using established
norms and providing rewards accordingly_ Organizations under stress and
pressured to change must devise employee systems to encourage suggestions
for improvement. One method is to form taskforces or small groups to address
problems and craft solutions.
George Washington University Hospital was the site of a case study
report written by Hudson (1998), who interviewed the new chief executive officer
about changing the culture of the organization. When Universal Health Services
of King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, took over operations of the hospital newly
appointed chief executive officer-Phillip Schaengold noticed that no one smiled,
gave directions to those who appeared lost, and there were credible reports of
rudeness toward patients. Schaengold noted that changing the culture in that
organization was not just a nicety, it was a necessity for survival, and became a
major element of the new strategic plan. The first step was an employee cultural
assessment survey_ As a result it was discovered that annual reviews were not
routinely given, employees were not rewarded for good performance and
communication from leadership was considered poor.
After all 1,700 employees were provided training sessions in customer
orientation, they were expected to sign a letter agreeing to uphold eight
standards of service excellence (including the stipulation that they greet
everyone with a smile). Leadership's goal was to steer the facility into the black
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and increase market share two percent by May, 1998. While one might be
inclined to question the wisdom of this "change the culture ... or else," approach,
early reports indicate more favorable results than one would predict under the
circumstances. At the time of this article, market share results were not yet
known, however, since the implementation of the plan the monthly patient
satisfaction survey revealed an overall rate of 80 percent, the highest in the poll's
four-year history. Also, staff reported a generally positive reception by patients,
and anecdotally the number of complaint letters had decreased. The manner in
which this process was implemented might cause appropriate questions about
the sustainability of these changes.
In a 1998 study of attitudes, values and organizational culture in a large
Danish insurance company, Hofstede (1998) concluded that there was an
association of the "communication climate" factor with "overall satisfaction",
illustrating in that company that good communications and cooperation were
essential conditions for maintaining satisfied employees. It is noted that,
although no one is likely to find a simple one-to-one relationship of any aspect of
organizational culture with organizational performance, there is not much doubt
that organizational culture does affect performance. It may be the single
decisive influence for organizational survival, but this is difficult to prove,
because the required longitudinal analyses are not feasible.
This study argues that what is good for the organization and what is good
for its members may be independent considerations, and leadership actions can
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affect the organizational culture without negatively or positively influencing
employee attitudes, and management actions can affect employee attitudes
without changing the organizational culture. Hofstede (1998) also concludes that
it is only in the area of communication and cooperation where leadership actions
affecting the culture also impact employee attitudes. This has ethical
implications to the extent that satisfying a moral responsibility for the success of
the organization and satisfying a moral responsibility for the well being of its
members can be two separate goals, but they can be pursued at the same time.
Therefore, there is not an excuse to assume that ruthless exploitation of human
resources is an essential element for maximum organizational performance.
Heracleous and Langham (1996) study the importance of organizational
culture in strategic change orocesses and discuss change management issues
arising from leading strategic change at Hay Management Consultants. Once
again, experience in this process indicates that diagnosing and considering the
implications of organizational culture at the initial stages of a change program,
and conducting periodic cultural assessments, is very helpful to effective
strategic change. They also point out that it is important to bring in an external
viewpoint in the form of a trained process consultant who has not been
enculturated by any long-term relationship to the organization. Finally, they note
the importance of using communication not only to inform and coordinate, but
also to manage employee expectations to avoid feelings that the momentum of
change is decreasing.
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Bice (1990) encourages that employee orientation sessions be utilized
as a valuable technique for introducing new employees to an organization's
culture. He notes that the leader's visibility during the orientation of new
employees makes a strong impression on a newcomer, and provides two case
study examples of senior executives who make a point to attend all new
employee orientations. This is taken a step forward in a way not often discussed
in other articles and journals reviewed for this paper. Bice (1990) further notes
that a successful transition in an organization's culture is also dependent upon
sustained trustee support. This article holds that existing trustee orientation
practices usually consisting of half-day sessions devoted to bylaws, budgets, and
tours of the physical plant are incomplete. In addition, trustees should also be
focused on their oversight responsibilities for finance, quality, planning, and
leadership.
Although the CEO and finance department might make the major
decisions on a merger, no department is likely to find itself with greater
responsibility for affecting change after a merger or acquisition than human
resources notes Greengard (1997). Every employee is affected, because both
resources and cultures have to coalesce into a single entity. While this article
discusses the problems of merging two major banks, the lessons learned may be
applicable to healthcare. When Wells Fargo and First Interstate Bancorp
merged in 1996 a major problem was dealing with two wildly divergent cultures.
The problems were handled through a number of means, but two essential steps
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included the setting of solid communication of goals and melding the
corporate cultures. Greengard (1997) explains that a merger is not a time for
employees to listen to speeches and view video updates. Senior executives
must spend time discussing the changes and how they will impact the workforce.
Also, it is important to use a variety of tools including workshops, activities and
new work teams and taskforces to coalesce cultures.
Curran and Miller (1990) study the impact of corporate culture on nurse
retention. In the hospital setting it is noted that hospital product lines that focus
on a specific clinical service, and are generally physician dominated, can coexist
readily with a healthy nursing culture if interprofessional communications are
actively fostered. Three major steps are identified as essential to the
development of a strong successful culture: (a) instilling commitment to a
common philosophy; (b) developing and rewarding competence in key areas,
and, (c) consistently perpetuating commitment and competence by attracting,
building, and keeping the right people.

Physician Relationships and Culture
While the literature seems replete with journal articles written by either
professional managers, academics, and nurse executives, Levitt (1996) writes
from the perspective of a physician as to how to build effective working
relationships with healthcare executives. His report describes techniques that
have led to successful working relationships between an academic radiologist
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assigned to organize two community hospital radiology departments for
Barnes-Jewish Hospital, St. Louis Children's Hospital and executives in that
system. He concludes that effective working relationships between physicians
and healthcare executives are built by learning the culture, recognizing
differences, offering assistance, taking steps toward better collaboration, and
avoiding pitfalls. Learning the culture means for the physician to learn the basic
concepts of business and health administration and the practices and
organization of the healthcare system within which the physician practices. This
education allows the physician to understand the "why" of the system's plans and
helps establish the physician's credibility with management. It is also important
for the physician to recognize the cultural similarities and differences between
the practice of medicine and the practice of healthcare management.
Sice (1990) supports this point in noting the importance of physician
involvement, explaining that it seems inconceivable that healthcare
transformation could ever proceed without physician involvement. Physicians
must be closely involved in the process to the level of having a direct voice in
shaping the desired culture. If the physicians cannot see some type of positive
benefit to their practice they are not likely to support the cultural change effort.

Theoretical Aspects of Research Design and Methodology in the Literature
The efficacy of the HOAS survey is discussed twice in this project. First in
the literature review, the theoretical construct surrounding the development of
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the instrument by Maehr and Braskamp (1987) is provided. Next, in the
methods section the practical statistical strength and reliability is provided. In
this section of the literature review it is important to ground the research design
in the literature as well. This includes two aspects: (a) the efficacy of
semistructured interviewing as was used in this study, and (b) the efficacy of a
retrospective multiple case study using a convenience sample of private not-forprofit hospitals in a classical pretest/posttest model. The participating hospitals
gave the HOAS at some time (T1), then implemented certain leadership
interventions, and gave the HOAS again at some later date (T2). The leaders
are interviewed using a semistructured interviewing technique.
According to Russell (1994), semistructured interviewing is an
experimentally valid design component best utilized when the interviewer may
not have more than one chance to interview someone. In the case of hospital
executives it is important to glean as much information as possible during the
first interview, because they are participating voluntarily and without any
obligation to be interviewed even the first time, much less the second. They
might not return the call a second time.
Russell (1994) describes a continuum of methodologies from the informal
interviewing technique, through unstructured, semistructured, and structured
interviews. The semistructured interview has much of the freewheeling quality of
unstructured interviewing, but is based on the use of an interview guide. This
consists of a written list of questions and topics that are covered in a particular
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Shi (1997) notes that the before-and-after design is effective because it
provides a basis for comparison of data (before and after), and it may be able to
control for attrition, because the preintervention observation makes it possible to
determine whether those who dropped out before the second observation
differed initially from those who remained.
Two validity threats to this design, however, are maturation and history in
that the longer the period of time of the observation, the more likely that these
two threats will happen and confound the results. In the absence of objective
reference or norm groups for comparison, problems may occur when attempting
to establish specific judgments about the leadership interventions, so one must
be careful not to make statistical claims as in the case of what might be possible
with a more controllable experimental design such as the true control group pretest/posttest design. More detail will be discussed about threats to validity in
Chapter Three.
Nevertheless, Shi (1997) notes that the behavior of individuals observed
in an artificial environment (Le., laboratory) will be drastically altered, or simply
not happen at all, if examined outside of the natural social setting. If the
stringent design requirements of experimental research are to be satisfied, the
design often becomes feasible only with small and atypical groups, in which case
the conclusions cannot be generalized with any certainty.
Shi (1997) notes that "ethical and time considerations make it infeasible to
study behavior in artificial settings. In addition, conducting true experiments with
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large and representative samples is typically more complex and costly than
other designs. Because of these limitations, nonexperimental (or quasiexperimental) designs are more widely used in health services research" (po
162). Such a design is utilized for this study.
Shi further explains (1997) that health services experiments often occur
outside laboratories or a controlled environment, usually in real-life settings.
Experiments conducted in such natural settings have high external validity and
are suitable for applied research that focuses on problem solving, but the major
weakness is the low level of control compared with laboratory experiments.
Since the researchers often cannot assign subjects randomly to various
treatment conditions or to control groups, it is more difficult to control for internal
validity. Internal validity threats for this study are discussed in more detail in
Chapter Three: Methods, under the section on limitations of the study.

Literature Review Summary
It is obvious from the background literature that the concept of
organizational culture has been widely discussed among academics and
practitioners for many years, but it has been especially so over the past two
decades. It is considered by healthcare and other industry leaders as one of the
most important issues in management, and its skillful manipulation has been
credited with miraculous turnarounds in corporate performance. Conversely,
failure to pay attention or disregard for the importance of culture has been
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blamed for countless failures in numerous industries. Although much has
been written about culture and credit or blame has been placed on it for
successes and failures, the literature revealed relatively few examples of
empirical studies focusing on specific leadership activities and their potential
impact upon culture, for better or worse.
Worse yet, executives are trying all sorts of interventions in an attempt to
improve the culture of their organizations, even though there does not seem to
be much in the literature in terms of specific leadership activities that have
actually been tested or compared with other types of interventions as to whether
or not they really have a positive impact, or any impact whatsoever. These
various leadership interventions seem to fall into the "things-we-tried-in-ourorganization" approach.
In summarizing these management interventions described in the
literature, the most prevalent activities seemed to fall into one of five categories.
These categories include: (a) restructuring, re-engineering, or re-design;
(b) Total Quality Management/Continuous Quality Improvement (TQM/COI)
initiatives; (c) human resources; (d) communications; and, (e) physician
enterprise efforts.
Examples of restructuring, re-engineering, or general work redesign or
redesign of patient care systems given by various sources included downsizings,
changing the span of control by flattening out the organization and removing
layers of management, and the creation of new committees and positions

96
designed to address cultural issues. One hospital created a cultural design
team and appointed a senior executive as the cultural design officer. Reengineering and restructuring also took the form of split division responsibilities
and related cross training to encourage acceptance of change and protect the
organization in rapidly fluctuating environments. Another popular intervention in
this category included implementation of self-directed work teams thought to
improve performance through empowerment of workers and increased employee
involvement in decision-making and planning. There were several examples of
this type of intervention.
Matrix organizations were also discussed under this category as
potentially leading to cultural change as they contribute to the breaking down of
barriers in the workplace and depend upon employees being able to work on
projects more independently and across functional areas. Strategic planning
was also discussed in terms of the involvement of various levels of employees
and as a way to reorganize the focus of the health care delivery system, to anow
it to change directions and adapt to changing environmental demands for less
expensive but accessible care. At the same time numerous articles in the
nursing journals d-iscussed the redesign of patient care services and the role that
culture plays in such efforts. While these articles touted the importance of
culture on the nursing units, like TOM/Cal it was often not clear which came
first. .. a successful patient services redesign that leads to a better culture, or a
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cultural shift that permitted success with the redesign. But they seemed to be
inextricably linked in every such article.
A second broad category of improvement initiatives discussed by several
authors include CQI and TQM and their relationship to culture, but once again it
was never very clear in the articles whether one needed to change the culture to
achieve success with TOM/Cal, or whether success with TOM/Cal would lead to
cultural change. But most of the articles link them closely, almost as though a
change to TOM/Cal and a change in culture were synonymous.
Numerous human resources interventions constituted the third category of
interventions noted by various authors as being essential for cultural
improvement in the organization. Several authors noted the importance of
crafting various reward and compensation systems that reward the values
identified in the new culture. Also included under the banner of human
resources interventions are such actions as enhancements to employee
orientation, increased emphasis on continuing education and training, and
culturally aligning hiring practices.
Several authors argued the importance of enhanced, thorough, open,
frequent, and honest communications throughout the cultural transformation
process. Recommended communications venues took many forms, and there
was no particular consensus on which types or media were best, so long as
communication is frequent and honest.
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Fifth, at least two authors noted the importance of making special effort

to involve physicians in cultural transformation efforts. Although they may not be
employees of the hospital or health system, they nevertheless constitute an
important sub-culture in the hospital, and they bear significant influence on
nursing unit and overall hospital culture.
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Chapter Three- Methods
This is a qualitative multiple case study analysis designed to study the
potential effects of various leadership behaviors or interventions on certain
aspects of organizational culture, particularly as measured through employee
satisfaction, commitment, and strength of culture scores. It is crafted as an initial
or exploratory study. This chapter is organized so as to provide a description of
the sample, sample design, location of subjects, and the research tools including
instrumentation, administration and scoring the measurements, procedures, and
limitations of the study.

Descriptions of SampJe and Sample-Design
The sample was chosen after consultation with a doctoral level
organizational psychologist who has spent several years in the business of
assessing the employee commitment, satisfaction, and strength of culture of
many hundreds of hospitals throughout the United States. To choose a
statistically significant sample from the over 5,000 acute care general U.S.
hospitals would be beyond the financial and practical scope of the researcher
and the time limitations of this study, so there was no attempt made to choose a
statistically significant and completely random sample. A determination had to
be made utilizing the consultant's opinion as to which hospitals had given the
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assessment to their employees twice with an intervening period of leadership
interventions.
This general technique is termed "nonprobability sampling," because it
does not require the specification of the probability that each sample element will
be included in the sample (Henry, 1990; Patton, 1990; Babbie, 1992; as quoted
in Shi, 1997). Disadvantages of nonprobability sampling are that the sample
may not be representative of the population of interest and therefore may not be
generalized to the population, and sampling error cannot be calculated or
selection biases controlled. On the other hand nonprobability sampling is
considerably less expensive and time consuming, more convenient, and is useful
when probability sampling methods cannot be used. In a field experiment it may
be one of the few sampling techniques available under any circumstances.
An example provided by Shi (1997) of a situation where nonprobability
sampling would be necessary would be if there were very few population
elements (e.g., cities, hospitals in the region, etc.). In such a situation a
sampling based on expert judgment might actually be more reliable. As Shi
(1997) notes, nonprobability sampling methods are more common in the early or
exploratory stage of a study where the purpose is to find out more information
about the topic under investigation, discover interesting patterns for future
research, and generate hypothesis for more formal investigation. One of the
commonly identified nonprobability sampling methods identified by Shi (1997),
and the one used for this study, is purposive sampling.
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Purposive sampling selects elements based on the judgment of an
expert in terms of the representativeness or typical nature of population elements
and the purpose of the study {Shi, 1997}. This method is used with small sample
sizes, because random sampling would not select the representative elements.
In this study, for example, a determination had to be made as to whether or not
certain hospitals had even made an attempt to measure the organizations'
cultures in the first place.
Five hospitals were identified that would be likely candidates.
Participation in the sample included the following criteria: (a) the hospitals had
given the Healthcare Organizational Assessment Survey (HOAS) to any sample
of their employees at least twice over a period of time; (b) there had to have
been an intervening period of leadership activity designed to address the HOAS
scores; (c) chief executive officer would agree to be interviewed; (d) governance
and ownership was private, not-for-profit; (e) the facility measured was an acute
care hospital existing as either a stand-alone hospital or as a member of a
healthcare system; and, (f) full access to the cultural strength, employee
commitment and satisfaction scores would be granted. Two hospitals were
located in the state of Indiana; one each is located in the states of Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Kentucky.
The study was limited to private not-for-profit acute care facilities to limit
the number of potentially confounding variables. Surveying investor owned
facilities among a group of not-far-profit hospitals CQuid raise the question as to
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whether or not certain cultural norms might have been influenced by
governance orientation toward profitability. For similar reasons, it was decided to
limit the study to acute care hospitals rather than any other type of acuity or case
mix such as rehabilitation, psychiatric, or skilled nursing facility.
In summary, this is a field experiment using a nonprobability purposive
sample of not-far-profit hospitals. Each hospital gave the HOAS at T1 and T2
with an intervening period of leadership interventions directed toward improving
the HOAS scores. The hospitals chosen represent the largest number of
facilities that meet the criteria listed above who would be willing to participate in
the study and had attempted leadership interventions.

Instrumentation
The Heatthcare Organization Assessment Survey (HOAS) developed by
Maehr and Braskamp (1986) was utilized by all participating hospitals to assess
employee commitment, satisfaction, and strength of culture. The instrument is
published by MetriTech, Inc. 4106 Fieldstone Road, Champaign, Illinois, 618266479. It is a 200 item forced choice questionnaire wherein participants read a
root statement about the hospital and respond as follows: (A) strongly disagree;
(8) disagree; (C) uncertain; (D) agree; and, (E) strongly agree. A copy of the
HOAS is included in Appendix A.
The HOAS is a product of two decades of research on adult motivation. It
was developed using "Personal Investment Theory" (Braskamp and Maehr,
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1983; Maehr, 1984; Maehr and Braskamp, in press) as its basis. The theory
assumes that people have various incentives that influence their behavior.
People decide to invest their energy, time, and talents in many different activities,
depending upon the meaning and value they place on a particular activity. The
comparative strength of these incentives is a critical factor in understanding how
people behave, how they can work better, and why they work.
Personal Investment Theory stresses the individual's thoughts, beliefs,
perceptions, and values as primary determinants of choice and persistence in
the task or job. The meaning tasks hold for people has a critical influence on
their motivation to perform the work.
"Personal incentives" are the foundation of the theory. They can be
thought of as values and -personal goals, which guide and direct what people
choose to do and the degree to which they invest themselves in activity. It is
important to understand that the instrument measures several characteristics,
only three of which are included in this project. Four characteristics are
measured across all areas including accomplishment, recognition, power, and
affiliation.
The accomplishment scales examine the extent to which people value
interesting and challenging work, whether they see their jobs as providing
opportunities for them to be involved in such work, and whether they perceive
the organization as supporting such efforts through an emphasis on excellence
in its products and services. The recognition scales measure the importance
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workers place on respect and acknowledgement for their work activity_
Power scales measure the extent to which employees enjoy competing with coworkers for responsibility and authority. The affiliation scales measure the
degree to which people prefer to work as team members rather than as
individuals.
The HOAS also contains three independent scales for measuring job
satisfaction, strength of culture, and commitment to the organization. These
scales are reported as total scores rather than the aforementioned scales which
are separate measures for each of the four areas, and these independent scales
are of core interest for this study.
Job satisfaction has been extensively studied and various facets of job
satisfaction have been identif:ed. Although satisfaction in the HOAS is reported
as a summary index, the items are systematically sampled across the four
content areas measured by the personal incentive, organizational climate, and
job opportunity scales. The satisfaction scale includes items that correspond to
major facets of job satisfaction identified in the research literature such as:
satisfaction with pay, the work itself, with supervision, with promotion, and with
co-workers (Rhodes as quoted by Braskamp and Maehr, 2000). When the score
is low for a particular individual, it means that person is dissatisfied with large
segments of the current position. When it is lower for the entire organization it is
a critical indicator that should not be ignored. The HOAS is designed so that
when the instrument is scored it is possible to ascertain a detailed item analysis
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that is particularly helpful to executives. The detailed item analysis helps
identify specific areas of satisfaction and dissatisfaction and in defining
objectives for organizational change.
The strength of culture scale measures the extent to which organizational
values are perceived as being well defined and communicated to the employees.
When the score is high it means workers view the organization as having a very
clear set of norms, values, and sense of appropriate direction. They are in
strong agreement about what is rewarded at the organization, and they know
what the organization stands for and what really matters. Agreement with
company values will be widespread and deep among the workers. Conversely,
when the score is low it indicates that workers do not feel the organization has a
very well defined set of norms, vaiues, or a sense of direction. They do not
agree on what really counts. Ownership of a common set of values regarding
the organization does not appear to exist.
The commitment scale measures acceptance of and loyalty to the
organization as well as a sense of pride and ownership. This scale focuses upon
identification with the organization rather than an affective reactions to a job
(Cook, Hepworth, Wall and Warr as quoted in Braskamp and Maehr, 2000). It is
similar to other values stressed by the company (Farrell and Rusbult; Porter,
Crampton and Smith; Mowday, Steers and Porter as quoted in Braskamp and
Maehr, 2000). High scores mean that the workers expressed a high degree of
loyalty and commitment to the organization. They take pride in working for the
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organization and have a stiong belief in the organization's values. They also
think that each employee is an important member of the organization. They
have acquired a strong sense of ownership of the organization. When this score
is low it means that, overall, employees do not take pride in working for the
organization and do not believe generally in the values stressed. Further, they
tend not to have a strong desire to remain working at the organization, and are
far below average in their willingness to identify with the organization. They do
not have a sense of ownership that would be expected of other workers at other
organizations.
Statistical correlations among these three supplementary scales are
shown in Table 3.1. These are based on' data from 347 adult men and women.
Table 3.1 .

Satisfaction
Strength of
Culture
Commitment

Satisfaction

Strength of
Culture

Commitment

1.00

.54

.61

.54
.61

1.00
.64

.64

1.00

These scales were constructed to parallel the four main dimensions that had
emerged in the earlier analysis of personal incentives. Thus, the same
conceptual framework used to measure incentives was used to assess the work
environment. This approach resulted in an instrument with which information
eQuid be gathered and decisions made about individuals, jobs, and organizations
in terms of the same set of measurement scales.
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Initially, 200 new items were constructed. Because of the different
nature of the areas being assessed a modified format was used. However, fivepoint response scales were retained for consistency with earlier results, and the
instrument was administered to 340 mangers and executives at six different
kinds of organizations.
Since the plan called for parallel measurement across individuals, no
effort was made to factor analyze the new item pool. Items were selected for the
final scales by a series of rational evaluations and individual item analYSis.
Based on these analyses, ten items were retained for each of the scales. The
final number of items retained for the culture scales varied with five items being
kept for the power scale and nine for each of the other scales. The final
satisfaction scale consisted of rNelve items while seven items were retained for
the strength of culture scale and nine for the commitment scale.
Published reliability coefficients for the scales range from .80 to .88 as
follows in Table 3.2 (Braskamp and Maehr, 2000):

Table 3.2
Reliability Coefficients
Satisfaction Scores

.80

Strength of Culture Scores

.82

Commitment Scores

.88
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The age distribution of the respondents yielding the normative data in the
development of the HOAS is shown in Table 3.3. The average age of
respondents is 37.3, with reasonable representation across the range from 18 to
79. However, the age range most often encountered in the normative sample is
the 26-35 year age group.
Table 3.3
Age range

Percentage

18-25

11.5%

26-35

35.6

36-45

27.9

46-55

17.6

56-79

8.4

This is a passive less invasive study, so for hospitals to be eligible for the
sample they had to have already administered the HOAS prior to being
approached to participate in the study. No hospital administered the instrument
because of this study. The range of the three scales is from 0 to 100.
Second, an interview questionnaire was developed based upon findings in
the literature review as to what types of leadership interventions are prevalent in
the healthcare field. This instrument is intended to assess the chief executive
officer and other senior executives in the participating organizations as to what, if
any, leadership interventions were implemented between the first time the HOAS
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was administered and the second administration. In summary, five hospitals
were chosen that had administered the HOAS to employees twice, and an
interview questionnaire was developed to assess what interventional actions
leadership had taken between the two times the HOAS was administered. The
interview questionnaire was developed based upon the literature as to what
types of interventions have been commonly used.
Based upon literature in the field the management interventions identified
as occurring most frequently fell among these five major categories: (a)
restructuring, re-engineering, or redesign of patient care services; (b) total quality
management or continuous quality improvement efforts; (c) human resources
interventions; (d) communications efforts. and, (e) attention to physician
relationships. Within each of these-categories other more specific interventions
were discussed throughout the literature. These categories are reflected again
in Table 4.6, and are utilized to group certain leadership interventions in order to
determine how they may have influenced the change in commitment,
satisfaction, and strength of culture scores.
The purpose of this interview questionnaire was to prompt the interviewed
executive to be thorough in a self assessment of all of the interventions that had
been attempted, but not to suggest or lead, while at the same time providing
continuity in the interview process from one hospital to the others. Thus, each
executive officer would be asked the same assessment questions, but the
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interviewer and interviewee are left open to pursue leads. A copy of the
interview questionnaire is in Appendix B.

Administration and Scoring the Instruments
Since hospitals were chosen that had already administered the HOAS to
their employees or a subset thereof, there was no way to exert influence over the
processes utilized to identify participating employees. Each hospital had the
instruments scored by MetriTech Corporation and was utilizing the scores within
their organizations as they saw fit in an effort to improve upon them. This study
essentially assesses and compares the various management interventions
attempted as derived from the literature to determine the validity of the working
hypothesis: that leadership interventions can positively influence organizational
culture as measured through employee satisfaction, commitment, and strength of
culture.
The questionnaire was scored manually_ If a participating executive
answered "yes" to a particular intervention that was scored as a "+,Jt and a "no"
was scored as a "-." However, "yes" responses were also followed up with a
request to expand upon the answer in order to allow elaboration on particular
leadership interventions that might provide valuable additional information as to
what specifically certain leaders may have done in order to improve their cultural
assessment scores, and responses were recorded.
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Description of Procedures
This section is intended to provide a clear and concise description of
exactly what was done in this study and how the data will be analyzed.
Step One: Telephonic meetings were conducted with the consultant
organizational psychologist assisting with the purposive sampling technique to
determine which hospitals should be contacted to participate in the study.
Step Two: Once the subject hospitals were identified, each chief executive
officer was mailed a letter by the consultant for the purposes of introducing the
primary investigator and asking that the executive consider providing support to
the study through participation.
Step Three: Each letter was then rollowed,up with a telephone call from the
principal investigator in order to seek direct contact with the chief executive and
obtain permission to use the scores and perform the interview. At that time the
nature of the study was explained, a request was made for participation, a
determination was made as to whether or not the hospital would agree to release
the before and after cultural assessment scores, and the senior executive would
agree to an interview. Each hospital executive was assured that the data would
be kept strictly confidential. In the first case, the first version of the verbal
questionnaire was tested, and the researcher traveled to the hospital involved to
interview the chief executive officer and the senior executive in charge of the
cultural transformation team. That hospital also provided its before and after
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cultural asse~sment scores for employee satisfaction, commitment, and
strength of culture at that time.
Step Four: Generally, follow-up telephone conferences were established so that
the executive would clear enough time to respond to the interview questions.
This was the case in four out of five hospitals. In one sample hospital the chief
executive assumed the call would be coming from the initial contact letter mailed
in Step Two, and was ready to be interviewed on the spot.
Anecdotal remarks were recorded during the interviews, and all "yes"
answers were pursued to determine the strength of the response. Strength of
the response is an important issue, because an interviewee providing a casual
response of "yes".to a question \,vithout any follo\rv-up might not be reflecting as
accurate of a description as the-study would demand. For example, it is possible
that one hospital would pursue a certain leadership intervention with great vigor,
heavy emphasis, and robust decisive action, while another hospital might pursue
that same intervention in a much less committed manner. Yet, both executives
would answer "yes" to the question, even though one intervention was much
more emphatic than the other. Therefore, an attempt was made to verify the
"yes" responses in particular to make the data in Table 4.6 as accurate as
possible. Although this is difficult to control, a positive response in Table 4.6
indicates that the sample hospital fielded a bona fide effort with a particular
intervention.
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Step Five: Cultural assessment scores were sent via the U.S. Mail or
facsimile. In one case, the participating hospital is, in fact, the home hospital of
the primary investigator, and the Senior Vice President for Clinical Services and
Chief Operating Officer was interviewed and provided the data.
As a result, each hospital provided two sets of cultural assessment scores
that had been gathered over a longitudinal period of time, and each executive
had an opportunity to provide information through the interview questionnaire as
to what management interventions had been implemented between T1 and T2.
This allowed the principal investigator to make certain assessments as to what
types of interventions may have led to changes in the scores.
Step Six: The scores were then prepared :in table format, and percentage
improvement was calculated for each of the three scales (commitment.
satisfaction, and strength of culture) as well as percentage of overall
improvement.
Step Seven: The scores were compared and contrasted with the data in Table
4.6 to determine potential relationships between what types of interventions took
place and by what category with how the scores changed over time. Scores
were considered not only for overall change but also by category of satisfaction,
1

commitment, and strength of culture. Also considered for each hospital were
environmental factors regarding such variables as mergers, downsizings, and
other events that could affect and be influenced by the management
interventions.
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Limitations of the Study
As has been previously indicated, this is a retrospective case study with a
nonprobability purposive sample of private not-far-profit hospitals. It was
conducted as a field experiment. These hospitals gave the pretest/pasttest to
determine change in the culture (dependent variable) surrounding an intervening
period of time during which certain leadership interventions (independent
variables) occurred. Executives are interviewed utilizing a questionnaire survey
(Appendix B) regarding their efforts to improve the cultural scores by application
of leadership interventions identified in the literature. The scores changed to
varying degrees during this intervening period. No study of this nature with as
many hospitals nor geographic diversity of this degree could be identified in any
of the literature. Further, no other study could be identified in the literature
review that tested leadership interventions as specifically as this study, and no
other literature review on organizational culture provided any other more specific
examples.
Where possible, attempts were made to control for or eliminate potentially
confounding variables. For example, the study included hospitals with the same
governance/ownership and hospital acuity type. That is, governance for each
participating hospital was private, not-far-profit, and each facility was an acute
care hospital. Therefore, each hospital involved shared the same community
charitable responsibility. This was important so as to not introduce other
possible competing variables such as profit motivation and differing cultures
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secondary to one facility being acute care white another was a psychiatric
facility or some other type of care setting. Rudestam and Newton (1992) refer to
these variables as "delimitations," because they are the opposite of "limitations,"
that is, they tend to improve the internal validity of the study_
As was previously mentioned, any time data depends upon an interview to
determine a individual's perceptions, there is room for bias. However, in this
case a strong effort was made to control for this bias by using the interview
guideline but pursuing responses to determine their strength.
Campbell and Stanley (1966) (as cited in Shi, 1997) point out that the two
general categories of validity threats are internal validity and external validity.
Internal validity refers to the ·study outconle being caused by the independent
variables instead of some extraneous variables. External validity is related to the
generalizability of the results. An experiment with a high degree of external
validity means that the experimental effect can be generalized to the population,
treatment, setting, and measurement variables of interest. Shi (1997) reports
that field experiments such as this often have high external validity_ Internal
validity, however, is a problem to control.
Since this is an exploratory investigation, the outcome of this study will
assist future studies in controlling for other variables. Even though the sample
size is relatively small with five hospitals, based upon the literature review this is
still the largest study that has attempted to identify any relationship between
specific leadership interventions and their impact upon cultural assessment
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scores. The only other study similar to this, and it involved only two hospitals
both located in the same city, was the McNeese-Smith study (1996) described in
the literature review. While there were other studies involving more hospitals,
those efforts were directed at CQlrrOM activities and not specifically at
leadership interventions and their potential impact upon cuttural scores.
Shi (1997) points out that the most likely threats to validity of the beforeand-after design are maturation and history. Maturation refers to changes to
research subjects due to the passage of time rather than the experimental
intervention. History refers to events that happen in the course of the
experiment other than the experimentally manipulated independent variable.
The longer the period of the experiment, the more likely that these threats
may impact the results. In conducting a nonexperimental or quasi-experimental
test in a natural setting such as a hospital, these threats to validity are nearly
impossible to control. To do so causes limitations in sample size and the groups
become atypical as Shi (1997) points out. For example, all of the hospital
samples gave the HOAS to senior executives and directors, participation at that
level was nearly 100 percent, and it is very easy to determine the extent to which
maturation and history may playa role in confounding the results. But to use
only those two work sub-groups (senior executives and directors) makes the
overall sample size much smaller and it becomes more difficult to generalize the
results to the rest of the hospital population. In this case however, no interval
between T1 and T2 exceeded three years. Since most research has noted that
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it takes many months or years to significantly change a culture,
measurement intervals that are too short could also yield biased results, as the
leadership interventions would not have had sufficient time to render any
measurable results. (See, for example, Bice, (1990); Dowd and Davidhizar
(1997); Rivers (1997); and, Riter (1994).
Three other internal validity threats of lesser degree to the before-andafter design according to Shi (1997) are testing, instrumentation, and statistical
regression. Testing threats refers to changes caused by measurement rather
than the experiment itself. This might occur, for example, when individuals are
tested repeatedly, thus improving their scores with each measurement providing
what amounts to a practice opportunity. In the case of this study no hospital
administered the HOAS more than twice, and, never with an interval less than
one year nor a maximum of three years.
Instrumentation refers to changes in the results that are related to
characteristics of the instrument or process rather than the experiment itself.
Examples would include different interviewers conducting interviews differently
from one subject to the next, thus yielding different results that were related to
the different interviewing style rather than the experiment. In this study all
interviews were conducted by the same interviewer using the semi-structured
interviewing technique and interview guide as recommended by Russell (1994).
Also, the before-and-after instrument was the same. All participating hospitals
utilized the HOAS for both measurements.
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Statistical regression refers to the tendency for extreme subjects to
regress closer to the mean or average over a period of time. This would be
observed on a postlest when the high scorers decline on the average and the
low scorers improve, regardless of the intervention. Since this phenomenon is
more likely to affect the results when subjects are selected for an experimental
condition because of their extreme conditions or scores (Shit 1997), it should not
be a problem with this study, because subjects were not chosen to take the
HOAS with these criteria.
Two other threats to internal validity that do not apply in this case include
selection and attrition. Selection is when there are systematic differences in the
selection of subjects between the experimental and control group and attrition is
the withdrawal of subjects from an experiment (Shi, 1997). Attrition is particularly

a problem when subjects withdraw at different rates from the experiment versus
the control group. Since this study is a simple before-and-after field experiment
design there could be no control group, so these internal validity threats are
mitigated.
Contamination is the final threat to internal validity noted by Shi (1997). It
refers to the situation where the components of the intervention program are
used by the control group. Once again, however in the simple before-and-after
l

pretest/pestlest field experiment design, there is no control greup, and this threat

is not applicable.
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Chapter Four: Results
Five hospitals agreed to participate in the study. Before and after scores
were obtained from administration of the Healthcare Organizational Assessment
Survey (HOAS). Those results are presented in Tables 4.1 through 4.5. Each
executive or designee was then interviewed using the interview guideline
illustrated in Appendix B. Those results are presented in Table 4.6. Anecdotal
comments are included at the end of this chapter for each of the participating
hospitals.

Table 4.1
First and Second Assessment of Employee Commitment, Satisfaction, and
Strength of Culture, Hospital # 1
First
Score
(N=382)

Second
Score
(N=442)

Commitment

25

46

21

84%

Satisfaction

8

42

34

425%

Strength of Culture
Mean 0/0
Improvement

31

58

27

87.1%

Change
In
Score

0/0

Change

85.5%
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Table 4.2
First and Second Assessment of Employee Commitment, Satisfaction, and
Strength of Culture, Hospital # 2
First
Score
(N=1,157)

Second
Score
(N=1,312)

Change
In
Score

0/0 Change

Commitment

38

46

8

21.0%

Satisfaction

38

42

4

10.50/0

Strength of Culture
Mean 0/0
Improvement

62

66

4

6.40/0
12.6%

Table 4.3
First and Second Assessment of Employee Commitment, Satisfaction, and
Strength of Culture, Hospital # 3
First
Score
(N=31)

Second
Score
(N-81 )

I

Change
In
Score

0/0 Change

Commitment

52

70

18

34.6%

Satisfaction

24

47

23

95.8%

Strength of Culture
Mean 0/0
Improvement

14

72

58

414.20/0

65.2%
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Table 4.4
First and Second Assessment of Employee Commitment Satisfaction, and
Strength of Culture. Hospital # 4
First
Score
(N=90)

Second
Score
(N-83)

Change
In
Score

% Change

Commitment

87

89

2

2.2%

Satisfaction

61

82

21

34.4%

Strength of Culture
Mean 0/0
Improvement

73

86

13

17.80/0
18.10/0

Table 4.5
First and Second Assessment of Employee Commitment, Satisfaction, and
Strength of Culture, Hospital # 5
First
Score
(N=100)

Second
Score
(N-54)

Change
In Score

0/0 Change

Commitment

68

69

1

1.40/0

Satisfaction

47

85

38

80.8%

Strength of Culture
Mean 0/0
Improvetnent

11

37

26

236%
41.1%

122
Table 4.6
Leadership Actions Taken Between First Assessment and Second Assessment
Item #

Category and Question Topic

1

follow-up attempted

Hospital Response
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
+
+
+
+
+

Restructuring, Re-engineering

2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12

span of control
new committees/positions
split-division responsibilities
consolidation of services/products
self-directed work teams
expand roles/empowerment
organizational structure/matrix
reorganize focus, mission, vision
redesign patient care
work re-design/elimination
TQM/CQI
TQM/CQI quality initiatives

-

-

-

+

-

+

+

-

+

-

-

+

+
+

-

-

-

+
+

+
+

+

+

-

+

-

+
-

-

-

+
+
+
-

+
+

+

+

-

+
-

-

+

+

+

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+
+

+

-

+
+

+

+
+

+
+
+
+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+
9

+
12

+
15

-

Human Resources
13
14
15

16
17

employee involvement in decisions and
planning
employee orientation
change continuing education
change in hiring practices
change compensation/rewards

+

+
+

-

+

+

+
+

+
+

+

+

16

14

Communications
18

19

enhance communications overall
enhance communications between middle
management and employees

Physician Enterprise

20

management of physicians
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Summarized Interview Results. As each hospital executive was interviewed
the anecdotal remarks, especially for positive responses, were recorded and
summarized for the following reasons: (a) it was necessary to consider the
explanation of leadership interventions to confirm u+" or "-" status of results noted
in Table 4.6, (b) it is likely that others can learn from these examples of
leadership interventions in a way that might be adaptable to other organizations,
and (c) in a study of this type where hospitals are utilized as real world
laboratories it is difficult to control for all variables, nevertheless variables such
as potential environmental factors must be identified and discussed to the fullest
extent possible. This is necessary in order to make an informed judgement as to
whether changes in the cultural assessment scores are related to the leadership
interventions or could they be affected at least in part by other environmental
factors.
Hospital #1. This hospital waited three years between the first and second
assessment of the HOAS, and had instituted a reduction in force among
management prior to the first time the HOAS had been administered. It was
suggested through analysis of the survey results and as a result of open forums
where staff input was sought, that there were three areas of improvement
opportunity. It was determined that improvement was necessary in
communication within the organization, reward and recognition refinement and in
gaining staff input into topics of compensation and benefits priorities.
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The chief operating officer was interviewed for this study, because he
was primarily responsible for daily efforts directed at improving the cultural
scores, and he worked closely with the chief executive officer in the efforts.
Committees of staff were selected through collection of volunteers to develop
groups to address issues within communication, recognition and compensation
topics. Each committee had between 15 and 25 members. Directors facilitated
them, but the agenda was established through identification and prioritization of
concerns from the staff participants.
Numerous issues were identified and addressed by the committees.
Examples include: (a) internal written communications were modified to reduce
the number of publications but to utilize select methods and to provide more
meaningful content; (b) communicating between department directors and
employees had been identified as a problem, so leadership competencies were
modified to reflect their commitment to provide unit/department based
information to staff through routine and timely methods; (c) a leadership
fundamentals training class was developed and all managers and directors were
required to complete the course, including such topics as how to manage and
motivate staff, the values of the organization, and how to evaluate and provide
constructive feedback; (d) revamping of the entire recognition program to include
development of the employee of the month program, institution of a picture
display board to recognize the selected employee of the month, and revision of
the nomination process so that it is now entirely employee driven; (e) distribution
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of reward and incentive money directly to the departments so that directors
can use it to informally and spontaneously recognize staff efforts (e.g. pizza
parties, gift certificates, purchase of educational materials for the unit); and, (f)
numerous compensation and benefits modifications were operationalized (e.g.
sick time policies were modified to be more liberal based on employee input,
more routine and vigilant assessment of compensation comparisons were
undertaken, education of staff about vacation accrual was undertaken since this
was an area identified by staff as a poorly understood benefit.
The discussions used to follow-up on survey results also identified key
environmental dissatisfiers among the staff. Parking and food service were the
number one and two dissatisfiers of life at the hospital. The organization moved
on these topics and has since secured the approval of the campus to construct
another parking garage, which is underway at the present time. The mere fact
that the garage is under construction has yielded many positive affirmations from
staff as to the importance of the Healthcare Organizational Assessment Survey.
Additionally, a kitchen and cafe renovation plan concluded recently in providing a
significantly upgraded dietary option with fresher food and more options for staff.
Hospital #2. This hospital reported an 18 to 20 month interval between
administrations of the HOAS. The hospital had undergone a merger in October
1995, so the first administration of the HOAS occurred after the merger was
complete. In February of 1996 the first administration of the survey was carried
out and the CEO described the scores as poor. He attributed this anecdotally to
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the fact that the merger had only occurred a few months before the test.
Realizing that the scores were not to his satisfaction, this CEO decided to form a
cultural design team (COT), establish focus groups to look at specific aspects of
the culture, and assigned a senior executive to lead the cultural transformation
efforts on a day-to-day basis. Also, a special award entitled the President's
Award was established to recognize excellence, to help people feel appreciated
and to establish the difference between what the CEO described as "transaction"
versus "transformation." He wanted transformation in the organization and,
further, to reward behaviors leading to transformation.
The CDT developed core commitment statements that were accepted by
leadership and the board of directors. Fift~' employees participated in this
process and isolated 100 behaviors organized around the core commitments.
Two examples include respect and innovation. Members of the COT met with
every director to assist him or her in understanding the process. The CEO noted
the importance of the CDT in building what he called a "cascading effect" into the
organization.
A program was implemented in which each employee was empowered to
spend up to $200.00 to solve a patient or customer problem on the spot.
Patients or family that were upset about something are sometimes given flowers
on the spot, or if there is a question about the hospital losing a personal item
such as a pair of glasses, rather than arguing with the patient, the items are
replaced or the patient is compensated on the spot. Staff have bought hats for
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cancer patients, and in one case a distraught pre-operative child who had
forgotten his favorite toy had it replaced within a few minutes by a nurse who
drove a few blocks to a Wal-Mart to buy a new one for him.
An increased effort toward enhancement of communications was not
limited to hospital employees. Communicating and relating positively with
physicians became a constant strategic effort. The CEO reported that masked
physician scorecards were developed pertaining to outcomes across service
lines by physician. Quality, cost J and profitability were considered important, and
leadership should not feel the need to apologize for it.
Pertaining to changes in hiring and promotional practices, this CEO noted
the importance of proving to employees that, if they do well, they have
opportunities for promotion in that organization. He cited an example as being
his Chief Operating Officer (COO), who had been the manager of the intensive
care unit. There were those in the organization who had wondered whether she
had the experience to be COO; however, the CEO explained that innate
intelligence and relationship skills were more important attributes to consider
than prior experience in the role, and that it was important to people in the
organization to see someone promoted in the organization who had done well
and lived the values.
This CEO expressed the belief that it is important to take care of
employees and make them feel good about the organization, because his
personal belief is that that is translated into patient service. They did this in part
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by developing a success-sharing program so that, if the organization does
well, it is translated financially to employees. Employee training has also been
re-emphasized including tuition reimbursement.
Hospital #3. This CEO reported a two-year period between the administration of
the HOAS, and also implemented a broader array of leadership actions,
especially in the category of re-structuring and re-engineering. He noted an
increased emphasis on self-governance, decreasing the size of the executive
leadership team to facilitate quicker action, and the addition of new positions
including a vice president of medical affairs and business development.
There was a great effort to align like services around a product line
approach and to consolidate services as much as feasible. Examples provided
included the combining of all therapies under a single director, combining the
operating room and materials management under common leadership as well as
all clinics. Neurosciences were combined under a single individual as well as all
cardiology services.
Twenty self-directed work teams were created and trained by other
specially trained department managers in a "train-the-trainer" program. A special
emphasis was placed on empowerment of staff, especially in clerical areas.
The focus of the hospital was changed. The CEO explained that
previously the hospital had been a closed and parochial environment that was
not in touch with the community and medical staff. The emphasis was placed
upon building customer focus. In this environment, physicians were defined as
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customers, too. To operationalize this more physicians were placed on the
board of directors. Whereas previously only one physician had been allowed to
serve on the board, the number was increased to five out of 20 board members.
There was a specific emphasis placed on work re-design and elimination
which included outsourcing of office supplies, implementation of a "just in time"
inventory system, reorganization of the block time schedule in the operating
room, and change of the actual physical design of the physical plant in the
ancillary departments to decrease redundancy of work, especially in information
system's patient registration area.
A singular effort was made toward quality initiatives. A quality council was
activated, and the hospital has since· won the highest achievement award
provided through the regional hospital council.
Specific efforts were also devoted to increased employee involvement in
decision making, and compensation was tied to new initiatives in cost-reduction.
Involvement of medical staff in strategic planning was increased. The day of
this interview the CEO had just given $15,000 in awards to three anesthesia
technologists who had been instrumental in writing a plan to eliminate $300,000
of costs from the operating room. Also pertaining to compensation, the hospital
moved toward an incentive plan that was much more heavily weighted on
success with objectives rather than across the board base salary increases.
Continuing education was changed, with more offerings provided on-site.
Prior to the HOAS survey results educational opportunities were limited and
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required travel outside the hospital. Now the community colleges go to the
hospital to provide some courses.
Communications were enhanced by changing various meeting schedules.
Currently the senior executives meet with employees at around the clock
scheduled meetings twice a year, and the CEO has lunch with 20 employees
twice a month. Anyone can sign up to have lunch with the CEO, and there is no
agenda. They are encouraged to discuss anything that might be on their minds.
The CEO reported that the issue of managers communicating with
employees continues to be a concern, although interventions have been
implemented in an effort to get at this chronic issue. The structure of the
meeting has been changed in that directors are now expected to choose five to
six employees to bring with them to the monthly director's meeting, and copies of
the minutes are distributed through the directors to all employees.
Hospital #4. This CEO administered the HOAS first in 1995 and again two years
later in 1997. He reported that while there was a change in some of the people
in given administrative roles between 1995 and 1997, there was essentially no
change in the span of control. After administration of the HOAS in 1995 the
sitting COO was changed out of his position and a new COO hired, but the old
COO was retained in the organization in another role.
An important environmental variable to consider with this hospital was
that, during the cultural assessment interval a second hospital was acquired and
merged with the hospital under study. The staffs were merged as well, and there
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was a change in the nurse executive position. While some positions were
consolidated, there was no significant effort so far as new positions or
committees formed around the cultural transformation effort.
Interestingly, this CEO reports that he rotates leadership responsibilities
continuously so that people do not get bored in their positions and so that they
have more exposure to all aspects of the organization. There was some work redesign and additional consolidation, for example in the area of cardiovascular
diseases (e.g. cardiac rehabilitation, special procedures, and cardiac diagnostics
were merged to create a formalized department). This CEO stressed that he did
not "direct fire," in that teams were assembled that carried out the unit
consolidations.
The patient care services department becarne more oriented toward
addressing nursing issues rather than excessive attention to the nursing model.
The CEO attributes an impressive improvement in patient satisfaction scores to
this approach.
There was a major effort devoted toward the development of TOM/Cal
methods that worked in both hospital operations and on the physician side.
They were separate processes, because the physicians had a tendency to offload problems onto the hospital administration instead of asking what they
should be doing about pathways and clinical based outcomes measures. The
desire was to motivate the physicians to pay closer attention to how they
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practiced medicine, while at the same time correcting legitimate operating
problems within the hospital.
Human resources changes included moving from a two day to a single
day employee orientation so as to eliminate boring material that could best be
accomplished in another venue. Although there was no specific policy change,
employees were encouraged more strongly to participate in continuing education
than had previously been the case. This CEO also reported a concerted effort to
change hiring practices in order to attract and hire candidates that were more
closely aligned with the hospital's philosophy. As the CEO noted, there were "no
more warm bodies."
A reward and bonus program was developed based upon both patient
care results and financial performance. Town han meetings were initiated every
quarter, and there is no set agenda. Employees can bring up anything that is on
their minds. Additionally, the CEO meets with one department every month,
does rounds through the hospital, and there is a CEO hotline for suggestions
which are reviewed by staff that provides a response within 24 hours.
As was the case with Hospitals #1 and #3, Hospital #4 reported that the
issue of directors communicating with employees is a frustrating issue. Special
effort has been made to address this matter, and the department heads are
given written programs and are expected to hand them out and review them in
detail with staff.
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Medical staff also received special attention in the cultural
transformation effort. Noting a lack of collegiality and joy in the workplace
expressed by many physicians, a guiding coalition was assembled of physician
leaders interested in working collaboratively with hospital leaders to address
physician concerns. This is still in process.
Hospital #5. This was the largest health service entity participating in the study,
and accordingly a senior executive assigned the responsibility for the cultural
issues was interviewed rather than the system chief executive officer. This was
deemed appropriate, because the interviewed executive would know more
details about exactly what, if anything, was done to influence the scores during
the interval between T1 and T2.
This was also the hospital system vlfhere there were the most
environmental influence factors occurring on or around the time that the HOAS
was administered. Three hospitals, including a tertiary teaching facility were
merged in January of 1997, and shortly after April of 1997 the HOAS was
administered. This is a good sample participant, however, because specific
leadership interventions were implemented with strategic intent to influence the
factors of strength of culture, commitment, and satisfaction. The scores utilized
for this study are those derived from the HOAS having been administered to the
directors in the merged institutions, because this hospital has not administered
the instrument twice to a sample of non-leadership employees. Therefore, pre-
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and post-test scores are not available for the employee group, but are
available for the directors.
This interviewee reported that the span of control increased after the
merger, but not because of the merger. There was no intent to change span of
control to influence the culture of the organization. This was counted as an
affirmative result, however, whether intended to or, because it must be
considered as an influencing factor since it did, in fact, happen.
After the first HOAS assessment a "Culture Strengthening Task Force"
was created and remained active for about six months, however, no new
positions were created. The task force drilled into the data, compared data
sectors to the values, and specific areas were identified where it was thought
scores could be improved.
There was heavy activity in conSOlidating virtually every hospital
department since the formally separate and distinct hospitals were all trying to
act as a single institution. In clinical programs the intent was to combine
services, but this was a challenging task. For example, in one particular clinical
product line attempts to consolidate into a single hospital caused some
physicians to leave the organization and go into competition at another unrelated
hospital. There was more success with certain hospital departments such as
laboratory, radiology, and pathology. It was antiCipated that the entire process
would take 5 to 7 years, and as it looks right now it may take a bit longer. Team
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members were empowered in virtually every department, although some
departments involved more team members than others.
A very explicit effort was devoted toward communicating the values postmerger, and all communications are value based. The system continues to work
on the vision statement, and during the past year there has been somewhat of a
transformation from a focus on mission, vision, and values (the focus in the early
period after the merger and the first administration of the HOAS) into a more
focused effort looking at specific strategies to implement the mission.
Patient care and nursing services remained as they had been with no
concerted effort to change patient care service models. However, a cost
excellence initiative was undertaken with benchnlarking, especially in the
supplies and materials areas. Each department was given cost benchmark data
and charged with reducing costs. As of the date of the interview $50 million had
been removed from the cost structure. This initiative had strong overtones of
TQM/COI, and when questioned about implementation of TOM/Cal initiatives,
the respondent indicated that all of the merged hospitals had had a strong
history of TOM/Cal prior to the merger. Those functions were, however,
centralized and coordinated post-merger.
There was a significant change in how employee orientation was
conducted. An entirely new program was developed focusing on mission, visiC?n,
and values. Also, a newly revised first line leadership orientation was
implemented with an orientation toward building solid leadership expectations.

136
There were also major changes in employee continuing education. A
"leadership college" was developed with ongoing courses for all employees at
the supervisory level and up. A "career quest" program was initiated for entry
level staff that included career counseling and literacy training for some staff as
needed. Third, a diversity initiative for managers and staff was developed.
Although the respondent noted that changes in company hiring practices were
thought to be important, none had yet been initiated. They are planned for the
future, but would not have had any impact upon this study since they were not
implemented during the intervening period between T1 and T2.
The respondent noted major changes in the compensation, salary, and
employee reward system. Post-merger there were many internal equity issues
which resulted in a number of internal equity adjustments. Changes in the
structure of the benefits program resulted in the evening out of benefits that had
been out of line from one merged organization to the other. Also, the nonfinancial reward system and annual employee recognition dinner was restructured, and all changes were linked back to make sure the espoused values
of the organization were being properly and formally rewarded.
There were major efforts devoted toward improving communications, and
the respondent reported that this was identified as a critical area. The internal
newspaper was entirely revamped as a primary source of general
communications. Directors meetings were changed and brown-bag lunches
were added to provide an opportunity for employees to meet the executives
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more frequently on a face-to-face basis. There was also a new emphasis on
improving communications beyond the level of the directors. Communications
tool kits were created to help managers "cascade" communications. Videotapes,
scripts, handouts, and overhead transparencies were developed to assist
managers in communicating to employees and to help assure that a consistent
message was being provided.
A major emphasis was devoted toward changing the leadership of the
physician enterprise. Care was taken to make sure that the governing body
included a physician from each of the pre-merger hospitals along with a
representative of the academic medical entity affiliated with the hospitals. A
joint medical council was created to govern the consolidation of the medical
staffs. Special care was taken to make sure that physicians participated in the
strategic planning process. Seven physician decision teams were installed (e.g.
capital acquisition, information technology, marketing, and managed care
contracting) guided by a physician operating team that oversaw decisions and
actions of the decision teams. Finally, approximately 60 physicians were
sponsored through a physician leadership-training program.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
In examining results of this project it is important to look for clinical
outcomes, trends and comparisons, following Shi's (1996) lead that the nature of
the nonexperimental or quasi-experimental design may be the best available
option in the real-world laboratory. Field experiments do not lend themselves to
a definitive level of statistical clarity, but the experiment is instructive. This study
lends itself, instead, to general conclusions and possibilities that are clinically
significant and managerially important rather than statistically significant given
the nature of the sample.
The comparison of commitment, satisfaction, and strength of culture
scores between the hospitals is instructive in terms of how much (or how little)
each hospital improved its scores cross-referenced with the particular leadership
interventions instituted in that facility. This is exemplified in several of the
hospitals.
Hospital #4, for example, which did the most restructuring and reengineering, had the second lowest improvement across all three categories in
the entire sample, and almost negligible improvement in commitment. Only one
other hospital showed a lower percent improvement (#2) but, it must be
considered that the interview section of the results revealed that both hospitals
had been involved in mergers. Hospital #2 completed a merger just prior to T1 ,
a:nd #4 completed a merger between T1 and T2. It is possible that employee
commitment, satisfaction, and strength of culture had been impacted in both
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hospitals by the need to meld two completely different workforces together
post-merger.
Hospital #1 , which showed the greatest percent increase in employee
satisfaction actually instituted the least number of leadership interventions in the
restructuring and reorganization areas, but reported specifically aggressive
efforts in reward mechanisms, concentrating largely in the human resources
communications and physician enterprise. That hospital still shows superior
performance even if the data are interpolated to assume one year intervals with
an even distribution of improvement each of the three years during the T1-T2
interval. Even though hospital #1 had not been involved in a merger, it is highly
likely that employees would not have considered the environment as stable,
because the hospital had just completed a major management reduction in force
prior to T1.
It is noteworthy that, while no hospital got worse, some improved
markedly more than others, and, in general there was more concerted effort by
all members of the sample in the interventional areas of human resources,
communications and physician enterprise leadership than in the restructuring
and re-engineering category.
Of the 19 leadership interventions, only 7 received universal action by
every sample hospital. Those categories implemented by all of the hospitals
include: (a) expanding of roles and empowerment of employees, employee
in' ... I·~ement in decisions and planning, changes in continuing education,
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changes in compensation and reward mechanisms, enhancement of
communications overall, enhancement of communications between middle
management and employees, and management of the physician enterprise.
It would appear that attention to cultural development in a hospital may be
sustainable over a number of years. For example, Hospital #1 outperformed the
other hospitals even if the 425 percent improvement in satisfaction is taken out
of consideration. That hospital undertook a multi-year cultural improvement
initiative, and measured culture with the HOAS at three-year intervals.
The data also seem to suggest that there may be certain leadership
interventions that are not essential for changes in cultural scores. Creating new
organizational structures and re-designing patient care delivery does not seem
imperative in increasing cultural assessment scores. No hospital implemented
any interventions in any of these areas, yet all improved their scores from an
average of 12.6 percent up to 85.5 percent. Also, four out of five hospitals made
no specific changes in the span of control, and yet all improved varying degrees
in their cultural scores.
Conversely, all of the hospitals engaged in (a) expanding roles and
empowerment of employees; (b) involving employees in decision and planning;
(c) revamping continuing education programs, (d) improving compensation and
reward programs; (e) enhancing communications; and (e) leading the physician
enterprise.
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There does not appear to be a directly proportionate relationship
between the number of interventions and improvement in scores, because the
hospitals that implemented overall the largest number of interventions revealed
relatively modest improvements in scores, in fact, second from the lowest (18.1
percent for hospital #4 vis-a-vis 12.6 percent for hospital #2) and hospital #1 with
the least number of interventions had the third best overall mean improvement,
better in fact than hospital #4 (28.5 percent per year over three years as
compared to 18.1 percent in a single year). One could consider that this finding
is linked to internal instability in hospital #2 and #4 because of the merger, but
remember, hospital #1 had also just implemented a reduction in force; therefore,
all three hospitals were under stress. It is possible that #1 did not add to the
stress by refraining from engaging in (or not needing to engage in) as much reengineering and internal redesign.
Of the 50 possible responses in the category of restructuring, reengineering and redesign (10 categories and 5 hospital responses per category),
there were only 26 affirmative responses or 52 percent, as compared to 41 of 45
(91.1 percent) in the human resources, communications, TQM/COI, and
physiCian enterprise categories. This was calculated based upon 9 categories
and 5 hospital responses per category.
Affirmative responses in the interventional areas categorized as quality
management, human resources, communication, and phYSician relationships
scored much higher across all hospitals. Comparing them, of the 5 hospitals
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showing improvements across the board, they focused their efforts on
TQM/COI, human resources, communications with employees, and physician
enterprise leadership efforts by a factor of almost 2 to 1. Much less effort was
devoted to restructuring, re-engineering, and redesign of patient care delivery
models.
Two hospitals (#4 and #5) showed relatively poor improvements in
commitment scores during the one year period of leadership intervention (2.2
percent and 1.4 percent, respectively). Examining these leadership interventions
reveals that, although they implemented TOM/CQI, human resources,
communications, and physician leadership at levels commensurate with the
other hospitals, their restructuring, re-engineering and re-design intervention rate
exceeded that of all the other three hospitals combined. In fact, these two
hospitals implemented restructuring interventions at a rate of 14 out of a possible
20 actions, resulting in an implementation rate in that category of 70 percent.
But the other hospitals implemented only 12 of 30 possible interventions for an
implementation rate of only 40 percent. Possibly related to this, it may be
noteworthy that the hospital that did the least in restructuring and re-engineering
(Hospital #1) experienced the largest increase in employee satisfaction scores, a
five-fold increase from 8 to 42, or a 425 percent improvement, whereas hospital

#4 which implemented more restructuring and re-engineering interventions than
any other hospital in the sample scored only a 34.4 percent increase in
employee satisfaction scores, and they also exhibited a heavy effort in human
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resources, communications, and physician enterprise leadership. Since
hospital #1 had implemented a major management level reduction in force just
before their cultural improvement efforts began, the interview revealed that
leadership wanted to get that completed and then begin a "healing" process with
great attention devoted toward improving the culture.
Inasmuch as these hospitals constituted a working laboratory, it is
essential to consider the environment within which each was operating and how
these environmental factors may have affected results of the HOAS between T1
and T2. Stated simply: What was going on in the hospitals and in the
environments within which they were "living" at the time of the studies? Some of
this has already been mentioned as background on the differences in scores. In
the case of Hospital #1 it may be noteworthy that it displayed the lowest
employee satisfaction score (raw score at the 8th percentile) of any other
hospital, but even though it improved to the 42 nd percentile with three years of
leadership interventions, why was it so low in the first place? As previously
mentioned, the semi-structured interviewing technique allowed certain leads to
be pursued during the course of discussion, and it was determined that the
hospital had just implemented a vice president and middle management focused
reduction in force prior to the HOAS assessment resulting in the loss of fully onethird of the department directors. It is possible that this contributed to the low
score in employee satisfaction in the first place, and a great opportunity to
improve in that criterion with focused attention. Accordingly, the results section
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reveals that this hospital focused almost its entire leadership interventional
effort in the human resources, communications, and physician enterprise areas.
There were also environmental factors to consider in hospital #2. This
hospital reported an 18 month interval between administrations of the HOAS,
however, it had undergone a merger in October of 1995. Therefore, the first
administration of the HOAS occurred just after the merger was complete in
February of 1996. This could explain why hospital #2 displayed relatively low
scores in the areas of employee commitment and satisfaction, but strong scores
in strength of culture. Employees may have felt a strong commitment to their
jobs but not the hospital they thought they once knew, and still were dissatisfied
with the tenuous work environments of trying to meld two different cultures after
a merger. Hospital #2 was second from the lowest in commitment score (38 th
percentile) and in the middle of the pack in employee satisfaction (also scoring at
the 38 th percentile). Hospital #2 scored a mean of commitment and satisfaction
of 38 at T1, second from the lowest. Only hospital #1 did worse, and it had just
eliminated one-third of it's department directors prior to T1 .
Environmentally, hospital #3 reported no extraordinary events prior to T1
or during the interval of leadership intervention between T1 and T2. It showed
impressive improvements in scores with an average mean percent improvement
of 65.2 percent, and especially in the category of strength of culture, improving
from the 14th percentile to the 72 nd • But it did not have to deal with melding two
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different cultures together after a merger, nor any significant reduction in
force immediately prior to or during the period of time under study.
Hospital #4 reported a significant environmental factor in that during the
T1 to T2 interval a second hospital was acquired and merged with the hospital
under study. The staffs were merged and the nurse executive was changed.
This phenomenon could explain why this hospital also showed a comparatively
low mean percent improvement of only 18.1 percent. While it began at T1 with
the highest mean scores overall, the modest improvements in the scores from a
low of 2.2 percent improvement and the 17.8 percent improvement in strength of
culture might be related to instability within the environment wrought by the
merger and leadership's need to meld two workforces and different cultures. In
other words, it started out with high scores to begin with, then experienced a
merger during the T1-T2 interval, which appeared to stunt its cultural growth.
Hospital #5 reported several potentially significant environmental factors
occurring on or around the time of HOAS administration. Three hospitals
including a tertiary teaching facility were merged in January of 1997, just prior to
the administration of the HOAS that Spring. Cognizant of the impact of culture
on the success of the merger and convinced that it demanded attention,
leadership administered the HOAS and instituted certain leadership interventions
with strategic intent. A culture strengthening task force was created after the
merger and remained active for six months, and the hospital experienced a 236
percent improvement in strength of culture. At T1 it produced a strength of
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culture score that was worse that any other hospital (the 11th percentile), but
improved it to 37 percent between T1 and T2. This hospital showed respectable
commitment and satisfaction scores to begin with at T1, and further made strong
improvements, especially in satisfaction between T1 and T2 (improving from the
47th percentile to the 85 th percentile, an 80.8 percent improvement). This may be
related to the emphasis of the hospital on compensation and rewards programs
that were designed to reward the particular values and to the specific efforts
devoted toward communicating the values post-merger. It is also important to
note that this hospitaL .. even though it had merged from three different
institutions ... devoted significant effort to try and "act like a single institution,"
according to the interviewee. But there was no widespread reduction in force as
a result of the merger which could have otherwise lowered the commitment and
satisfaction scores. That, however, did not happen.
There seemed to be one universal variable challenging leadership teams.
Four out of five executives interviewed reported significant difficulty in improving
communications between department directors and unit employees. The
executives generally reported that communications among the senior executives
was not a major problem, nor was communicating with and among the directors,
hut something seemed to break down between the directors and the much larger
number of 24-hour per day, seven day per week employees that reported to the
various directors. Some hospitals reported that it continues to be a current
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concern, and at least one hospital reported many special efforts directed at
improving communications at the director/employee level.

Conclusions
The findings suggest that the hypotheses are supported, although it must
be remembered that a non probability purposive sampling model will not allow
definitive statistical assessment of the hypotheses. These findings assert that
leadership interventions can positively influence organizational culture in a
measurable form over a longitudinal period of time and, further, suggest that
specific leadership interventions can be identified as being key predictors of high
cultural assessment scores.
Although social sciences field experiments such as this one may not allow
rigidly defined statistical conclusions, practical reality dictates that these types of
quasi-experimental studies be completed. In fact, use of the hospital as a
natural laboratory may mean that data gathered like these are the only data
available to guide the practicing leader, because it is extremely difficult to
structure otherwise controlled studies.
Just as importantly, studies such as this may allow the development of
hypothesis for further testing in a more controlled experiment. A controlled
experiment may allow data to be collected that would support statistical analysis,
although crafting such a model may be difficult due to the fact that the hospitals
are operating in a stressed natural environment. For example, it may be difficult
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to convince a hospital to commit the time and resources to administer the
HOAS at T1 and T2, but make no leadership interventions in the interim, whjch
would be necessary for a controlled experiment. Nevertheless, it is worth
considering.
It would appear that an emphasis in the areas of communication,
TOM/Cal (and the employee empowerment that implies), human resources
efforts (reward mechanisms, orientation, continuing education programs, and
hiring practices), and attention to the physician enterprise get the nod over
restructuring, re-engineering, and re-design efforts in improving employee
commitment, satisfaction, and strength of culture.
It is possible that emphasis on restructuring, re-engineering and re-design
efforts may even confound a leadership team's well-intentioned efforts with
communications, human resources, and physician relationships. Restructuring,
re-engineering and re-design may destabilize the environment within the hospital
in a way that counteracts the other efforts. It forces people to change and
threatens what they see as a stable, predictable environment. Some of the
hospitals in this study completed whatever restructuring they planned to do prior
to starting their focused efforts on cultural improvement. This might be an
instructive technique for leaders faced with the need for such actions in their own
organizations.
This study supports a recurring theme in the literature: mergers appear to
have a very adverse impact upon employee commitment, satisfaction, and
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strength of culture, just at the very moment in the organization's history when
these attributes need to be strong and functional. This turmoil and instability
may even overwhelm leadership's otherwise good efforts of improved
communications and strong physician leadership. The good news is the turmoil
can be overcome if leadership gives the organization the attention it deserves.
The literature sources pOinted out the probable lack of cultural attention that may
have led to the unraveling of some high profile healthcare mergers. While
several of the participants in this study had suffered adverse environmental
impact variables such as mergers and downsizings, none of them had
experienced a major crisis, all of them were still merged, and from the anecdotal
interview comments planned to stay merged. All of them were paying attention
in some form or another to the cultural aspects of their respective organizations.

Recommendations
Based upon the literature review, results, and conclusions of this study, it
appears as though any leader faced with implementing major changes in a
hospital should pay close attention to the cultural aspects of that change if it is to
be sustainable and ultimately successful.
When major events such as reductions in force, partial closures, or
mergers are contemplated it seems particularly important that the leaders design
specific mechanisms to: (a) measure the culture over time; (b) design specific
mechanisms to empower the members of the organization to help control the
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internal environment (this step may include many aspects identified as
TOM/Cal); (c) utilize the human resources within the organization to develop
clear values; (d) communicate those values constantly, thoroughly and
throughout all levels of the organization; (e) design reward mechanisms that
actually reinforce the stated values so that there is congruence between what
leadership says is important and what employees actuaJly see as being
rewarded; (f) constantly reinforce the values by involving employees in decisions,
orienting employees at the outset of their employment, and hiring employees
who display congruence with the values in the first place; and, (g) paying
attention to the associated physician enterprise in the organization. On this last
issue ... the physician enterprise ... be reminded of the literature review in which it
was pointed out that physicians constitute a very important and powerful subculture that asserts influence over the hospital culture. This cannot be ignored.

Areas for Further Study
As has been noted, this study was completed with a purposive sample of
not-for-profit hospitals, but there are several aspects that could be applied to
other studies. For example, could governance orientation toward not-far-profit
vis-a-vis for-profit status have any influence over culture? That would be
interesting to know, especially for our for-profit colleagues struggling in the same
healthcare marketplace. The experiment could be completed using a sample of
for-profit institutions.
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It should be possibJe to apply the structured interview questionnaire to
other studies with some modification. A controlled before-and-after design with
one or more hospitals administering the HOAS but taking no leadership actions
would yield results more likely to be validated through statistical analysis. This
eQuid be done with both for-profit and not-far-profit hospitals.
Another area for further study would include whether or not a much larger
sample size would continue to bear out the results of this study, which used five
hospitals. Combining these last two points, it would be interesting to develop a
fully controlled experiment by administering the HOAS to a hospital in a
particular environment, and not implementing any interventions. At the same
time the hospital sample size would then be increased, and the results could
then be compared to the hospitals where leadership made no focused efforts.
Could there be some type of impact similar to the well known and studied
Hawthorne effect? Could culture scores improve simply because of a perception
among employees that "management cares about what we think" because the
assessment was administered? A fully controlled study - if it could be done would shed some light on that issue.
Another governance issue for study would include whether or not there is
a difference in scores between hospitals based upon their ownership or mission.
For example, does a large state-owned academic medical center with teaching
and research sharing the stage with patient care have more or fewer barriers to
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improvement of culture than a smaller community hospital? Does
institutional size affect culture, and what must be done to change culture?
The environment within which the hospital is operating seems to have an
impact upon culture, but how much, why, and is it controllable? For example do
t

hospitals operating in large metropolitan environments tend to have different
cultural norms and scores than smaller hospitals in rural areas? While it may
seem intuitive that large tertiary teaching hospitals in big metropolitan areas
would be much more difficult to lead, individuals leading small rural hospitals in
smaller towns where there is no degree of anonymity and no financial margin of
error may have their own problems that make them just as difficult or stressful
from a cultural perspective.
One of the difficulties with a study of this nature is that the purposeful
sampling technique allows a choice of logical hospitals to participate in the
experiment, but the nature of the market limits the size of the total sample from
which to choose. It might be possible, for example, to find hospitals that give
employees their own "home-grown" employee satisfaction survey, and use those
results to make an assessment of the improvement in employee satisfaction.
But the problem with this approach is that each survey will be different, each will
have varying levels of sophistication, and at the end of it all, it would still be
impossible to generalize the results to the total population of hospitals, no matter
how large the study. The bulk of those home grown instruments will provide no
reliability data from which to work.
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All of these areas for further study could provide valuable information
to help leaders of hospitals build more effective institutions. The literature review
reveals a dearth of studies that focus on specific leadership actions and their
potential impact upon the organization's overall cultural health. It's time that
more concentrated studies be contemplated for these issues.
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Appendix A

HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONAL
ASSESSMENT SURVEY

INSTRUCTIONS
This survey has no time limit, but try to answer each question as quickly
as possible. Choose just one answer for each item. There are no right or
wrong answers, so please be as honest as you can. The Information you
provide and the answers you give will always remain confidential.
You have been provided with an answer sheet which you will use to
answer the questions in this booklet. Do NOT write your name on the
answer sheet. Your responses will remain completely anonymous.
However, please indicate your gender by filling in the -M- or -F- grid to the
right of the name grid. Also indicate your birth date by filling in the -Birth
Date- grid below the name grid. Only fill in the other grids if you are asked
to do so by the person who gave you the survey.
This survey has three parts, each with its own instructions. Be sure to
read each set of instructions before answering the items. Use the key at
the top of each page to select your answers. .
Remember to mark all your answers on the answer sheet. Be sure to fill
in the identification section before you begin. Use only a No.2 pencil to
mark your answers. If you decide to change an answer, erase the first
mark completely. Feel free to ask any questions you may have at any time.
Thank you

fo~

your cooperation.

A
SPECTRUMN

Development
Program
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INSTRUCTIONS: In this part. read each statement and decide to what extent you
agree or disagree with the statement.. Use the (ollowing key to choose your answers:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

I enjoy completing many easy tasks rather than just a few difficult ones.
When I reach one important goal, I immediately strive for higher goals.
I do my best work when I have the encouragement of others.
I set goals that are difficult to reach.
Money isn't everything; it's the only thing.
I like competing with others who are clearly.superior in skill.
I don't mind working when other people are having fun.
I pay little attention to the Interests of people around me.
I aim my activities toward a future goal..
Successful people like to win.

11. I keep a close watch over how much money I make.
12. I want recognition for what I do.
13. Games aren't much fun if the competition is too strong.
14. I work hard for salary increases and promotions.
15. I'm suspicious of friendly people.
16. In the past, when ('ve made sacrifices to help someone else, I felt satisfied.
17. I bounce back quickly from defeat.
18. When personal payoff is involved, 1 work harder.
19. Money motivates me to do my best.
20. I emerge as a leader in a group.
21. Successful people work hard for promotions.
22. I'd rather do something at which 1 feel confident than something challenging and
difficult.
23. Two of the best indicators of success are wealth and possessions.
24. I take pride in my work.
25. I'm a self-made person.
26. I have a tremendous amount of quiet inner strength.
27. I feel good about myself when I show my religious commitment.
28. Successful people work only for money.
29. I don't need anyone to motivate me; I motivate myself.
30. I'm able to show affection to my friends.
31. I enjoy adventu re and novelty.
32. Successful people are competitive.
33. People seek me out for advice.
34. I try to be in the company of friends as much as possible.
35 . Loyalty to my friends is important to me.
36. Successful people like to solve problems.
37. I trust people.
38. When I finally understand a difficult problem, I really feel great.
39. I feel best about myself when I'm fully responsible for seeing that something gets
done.
40. Pleasing someone Important to me makes me feel good.
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41. I forgive myself easily for failures.
42. I'm very satisfied when I'm totally involved in what I'm doing.
43. The more challenging the job, the harder I work.
44. When I receive an unexpected bonus for a job, I feel on top of the world.
45. I like to work in groups in which I have a good chance of being leader.
46. I like to compete against myself.
47. I work harder when '1m part of a team.
48. I put in long hours of work just to do a good job.
49.1 feel good when I've made a commitment to social or civic causes.
50. Successful people need to be number one~

51. I'm an ambitious person.
52. I feel really gre~t about myself when I do something others can't.
53. I have my long-range goals clearly in mind.
54. Successful people like to try something new.
55. Winning is important to me.
56. I succeed In whatever I do.
57. I need to be the top person in my department.
58. I'm too sympathetic with others to look out for my own interests.
59. Having other people tell me that I did well is important to me.
60. I .go out of my way to be friendly.
61. I seek out pOSitions of authoritY~
62. I delay immediate rewards for long-term goals.
63. I work harder when I get recognition.
64. I work hard to improve my skills.
65. I prefer jobs that pay for perfonnance.
66. When I've been jcharitabfe to others, it makes me feel very good about myself.
67. I can succeed at anything I want to do.
68. I feel great when I win.
69. I'm relaxed when I'm about to undertake a diffic~lt job.
70.1 worry about not having enough money.

71. Successful people like a challenge.
72. Jobs that I have to do by myself frighten me.
73'. I get up in the middle of the night to jot down ideas about my work.
74. -Status is important to me.
75. Successful people find work fun.
76. I ehjoy helping others even if I have to make some sacrifices.
77. I feel great when I'm recognized for my accomplishments.
78. I'm happiest when I'm making money.
79. My self-confidence varies depending on the situation.
80. 1 prefer tasks that have clear expectations about how to proceed.
81. I'm always thinking of ways to improve how I do things.
82. I like .tasks in which I'm told exactly what to do.
83. I feel good about myself only when my work is meaningful.
84. I enjoy trying to solve problems others consider impossible.
85. I prefer to work with someone on difficult projects rather than tackle them alone.

66. I get anxious when I don't know how well lim, doing.
87.
88.
89.
90.

I work hard 'because I want respect from my co-workers.
In my work, I prefer to know exactly whafs expected of me.
I feel confident when m directing the activities of others.
I set long-tenn goals.

,I
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INSTRUCTIONS: This part of the survey lists a number of opportunities that mayor
may not be provided in your cu"ent job or position. Use the following scale to choose
your answers.

MY PRESENT JOB PROVIDES OPPORTUNITIES ...
91. .. .. to demonstrate my competence and ability.
92. . .•to watch others grow and develop_
93. .. ..to receive extra ,benefits like paid business travel or tuition
reimbursement.
94. .. ...to be cited for doing good work.
95. .. .•to feel like I'm making others better and happier through my work.
96. . ..to compete for advancement opportunities.
97. • • .to work hard for faster promotions.
98. • •• to supervise the work of others.
99. • ••to feel wanted and needed by others at work.
100. • ....to get ahead of my'· co-workers.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107..
108.
109.
110.

.. .•to see who finishes the work most efficiently.
. •.to rec~ive encouragement from my co-workers to do the. best I can.
.. ...to help people directly. '
.. ..to earn respect from my friends because of my work.
. ..to feel good because I beat my competition.
.. ...to see a job well done ..
.. ..to work on chailenging tasks.
.. ... to feel loyalty to this hospital and the people in it.
• •• to improve my skills and talents ..
.. ..to receive extra attention because of my position.

111. .. .•to work closely with one or more co-workers.
112. • ..to redo a task to make it better.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117..
118.
119.
120.

.. .•to receive recognition for my work.
....to do interesting work.
.. ...to receive a ·pat on the back- from my supervisor for good work.
• ••to receive good fringe benefits.
... .to have the time to do quality work.
. ..to do meaningful work.
.. •. to work for merit pay.
.. ...to hire and fire employees.

121. .. ... to lend a helping hand to my co-workers.
122. .. ...to see others benefit from my help.
123. .. . _to increase my influence over others.
124.....to feel proud about my work.
.
125. . ... to feel responsible for a finished task or assignment.
126 .......to receive very good wages ..
127. . ...to work on new tasks, projects, or activities ..
. 128.. .. .•to get public recognition for a job well done.
129. • ...to have leadership responsibility ..
130..•.•to have friendly co-workers.
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171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

This hospital provides me with opportunities for advancement.
Competition among different work groups in this hospital is actively encouraged.
This hospital really cares about me as a person.
I know what this hospital stresses.
I feel that I'm in a -dead-end" position in this hospital.

In this hospital, we're encouraged to try new things.
I do extra work here because I want this hospital to succeed.
1 like the people I work with.
I don't think of doing something else in this hospital because it's too difficult to
change.
180. I enjoy the kind of work I do.

176.
177.
178.
179.

I know what really counts around here.
People here are always getting awards and extra benefits by doing good work.
We're treated as adults in this hospital.
Every person in this hospital can invent, create, promote, and solve.
I've said ·no· to other job opportunities in recent months.
Management regards conflict amon'g competing work groups and individuals as
healthy.
.
187. I feel that I share in the successes and failures of this hospital.
188.·1 regularly receive information about the quality of my work.
189. There are many incentiv€s here to work hard.
190. I have good job security in this hospital.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Management expects us to be productive workers.
I feel a sense of ownership in this hospital.
I'm optimistic about my future.
I'm encouraged to make suggestions about how we can be more effective.
It would take very little for me to move to another hospital.
I take pride in being a part of this hospital.
1 wish I could look forWard to a different job in the near future.
The emphasis here is on letting us compete and see who ends up the "winner.
Everyone in this hospital knows what we value the most.
If someone has a good idea, invention, or project, management listens and
$UPports it.
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Appendix B
Verbal Questionnaire for Chief Executive Officers and Designess in Charge of
Cultural Transfonnational Efforts in Designated Hospitals or Health Systems
1.

Did you take any action whatsoever in follow-up to the Healthcare
Organizational Assessment Survey given to your employees? If so, please
answer the following questions.

RestructuringlRe-engineeringlRedesign of Patient Care Services
2.

Did you make any changes in the span of contra]? If yes, please describe ..

3.

Did you create any new committees or positions? If yes, please describe.

4.

Did you institute any split division responsibilities? If yes, please describe.

5.

Did you consolidate anv service areas or product lines? Ifves, please
describe.

6.

Did you implement any self-directed work teams? Ifves, please describe.

7.

Did you expand any role functions or empower team members in the
hospital or health system? If so, please describe.

8.

Did you make any changes in organizational structure such as creation of
any matrix relationships or cross-referencing of departmental and
functional areas? If yes, please describe.

9.

Did you make any efforts to reorganize the focus of the hospital or
system? If so, please describe.

10.

Did you redesign patient care or nursing services? If yes, please describe.

11.

Did you implement any work fe-design or engage in work elimination or
elimination of tasks deemed wasteful or unnecessary? If so, please
describe.

Total Quality Management/Continuous Quality Improvement Processes
12.

Did you implement any TOM or COL quality assessment monitoring, or
other quality assurance initiatives? If yes, please describe.

Human Resources

13.

Did you implement any initiatives to support increased employee
involvement in decision-making or strategic planning activities? If yes,
please describe.

14.

Did you implement any changes in how employee orientation was
conducted? If yes, please describe.

15.

Did you implement any changes in employee continuing education
offerings or programs? If yes, please describe.

16.

Did you implement any changes in company hiring practices? If yes,
please describe.

17.

Did you make any changes in any compensation, salary, or other
employee reward system? If yes, please describe.

Communications
18..

Did you implement any new efforts toward enhanced communications
with employees? If yes, please describe.

19.

Did you implement any new effort~ designed to foster enhanced
communications among or between managers and employees? If yes,
please describe.

Physician Interventions
20.

Did you make any changes in the structure or management of the
physician enterprise, physician relations, joint planning, increased
physician participation in governance and management, or special
physician training activities? If yes, please describe.

